BLACK/BROWN COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN THE EDUCATION POLICYMAKING PROCESS

A Dissertation

by

RENE ROLANDO ROCHA

Submitted to the Office of Graduate Studies of
Texas A&M University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

August 2006

Major Subject: Political Science

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Approved by:

Chair of Committee,	Kenneth J. Meier
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ABSTRACT

Black/Brown Cooperation and Conflict in the Education Policymaking Process. (August 2006)

Rene Rolando Rocha, B.A., The University of Texas – Pan American

Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Kenneth J. Meier

The way race works to shape politics is changing as demographic patterns alter the traditional dynamic of race relations throughout the United States. One pattern is the increased tendency of African-Americans and Latinos to reside in the same locality. While popular opinion suggests that such contexts should result in the formation of "rainbow coalitions," several scholars have found evidence that inter-minority relations are characterized by high levels of political competition. One of the policy areas in which competition has been observed most often is education.

This dissertation examines the conditions under which African-American/Latino relations are likely to be characterized by cooperation or conflict within the education policymaking process. It utilizes a survey of 1800 school districts, containing 96% of all urban districts in the United States. The results produced by this study, therefore, are applicable to nearly the entire universe of urban educational systems. Another unique aspect of this project is that, rather than focusing on relations at one stage of the policy process, it attempts to trace this dynamic through each stage. Thus, the dissertation begins with a look at the circumstances under which Black/Brown electoral coalitions will form in school board elections. The findings suggest that coalition formation is

contingent upon structural contexts, specifically the presence of partisan elections, and upon the citizenship status of the Latino population within a district. The dissertation goes on to trace the cooperative and competitive forces that affect the hiring of African-American and Latino administrators and teachers. Lastly, I use theories of bureaucratic politics and racial context to study the quality of education received by minority students. I find that, controlling for other factors, more diverse school districts have more equitable educational policies. I also find evidence to support the contention that more diverse teaching faculties tend to result in beneficial outcomes for both African-American and Latino students.

For Emily, my best friend.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the numerous individuals who have provided support, encouragement, and honest criticism of my work. Jan Leighley, Paul Kellstedt, and Rogelio Sanez have all provided me with invaluable comments on this project.

I have been blessed to work under three great mentors throughout my academic career. Ken "Cap'n Smooth" Meier has been the best advisor one could hope for. Ken has selflessly worked to promote my career. He has gladly read multiple iterations of every manuscript I have ever produced, patiently pointing out my typographical errors. He taught me how to write good papers and ask interesting questions. Long after Ken retires, assuming he ever does, his impact on the discipline will continue through the numerous students which he has produced, all of whom know what constitutes a great mentor.

Bobby Wrinkle first introduced me to the world of empirical social science when I was an undergraduate at the University of Texas – Pan American. As my first research methods instructor, Bobby provided me with many of the tools I needed to succeed in graduate school.

My most influential mentor has been my father, Rodolfo Rocha. Dad exposed me to what life in the academy was like. He also instilled in me a set of values which continue to guide my work. In many ways, I see my life's work as assessing the success of the struggle for racial and ethnic equality that my father has been a part of. Give me a few years Dad, I'll figure out how good you guys did.

Lastly, I would like to thank my wife, Emily. She has been my greatest source of encouragement. When I was down, she picked me up. You are my life Emily. I should also thank my schnauzer, Jack. Nearly every paper idea I have ever had came to me while walking Jack. Jack, regrettably, is a post-positivist, preventing him from offering any real critiques of the ideas which was instrumental in generating.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: BLACK/LATINO COOPERATION AND CONFLICT

How does the political success of African-Americans affect Latinos? Conversely, how does the political success of Latinos affect African-Americans? These are the central questions of this project. Studies of racial and ethnic politics within the United States have long examined the determinants of African-American political success within the context of black-white relations. The comparatively smaller literature on Latino political success has likewise been within the context of Latino-white relations.

This approach has allowed for a level of simplicity necessary for theory-building in growing literatures; meanwhile, the historical geographic dispersion of African-Americans and Latinos has limited the extent to which a focus on black-white or Latino-white relations has resulted in an incomplete understanding of racial and ethnic politics with the United States. For example, African-Americans represent the largest share of the population in the deep South and mid-Atlantic states: Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware. Latinos, by contrast, are most concentrated in the Southwest states, such as California, Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and Colorado. They also represent a large share of the population in states with substantial immigrant populations: New York, New Jersey, Florida, and Illinois. A brief survey of Figures 1.1 and 1.2 shows no overlap between heavily African-American and heavily Latino states.

This dissertation follows the style of *American Journal of Political Science*.

Figure 1.1
States with the Largest Blacks Populations as a Percent of the Total Population



Figure 1.2
States with the Largest Latino Populations as a Percent of the Total Population



Figure 1.3
States with the Fast Growing Latino Populations as a Percent of the Total Population



However, minority residential patterns, and consequently minority social and political relationships, are not static over time. Looking at Figure 1.3 we see that the more prominent areas of growth for the Latino population include a number of Deep South states with traditionally large African-American populations, such as Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee. The probability of interaction between African-Americans and Latinos has also increased as the size of the Latino population has grown over recent years. In 1980 there were 14.6 million Latinos in the United States. By 1990 there were 23.4 million, and by 2000 there were 35.3 million

Latinos, a 141.7% increase over 20 years. As of 2004 Latinos constituted the largest minority group in the nation, comprising 14% of the population (compared to 12.8% for African-Americans).

This change in demographic and residential patterns has one obvious implication for political scientists: the politics of race can no longer be reduced to Anglo-African-American or Anglo-Latino interactions. Localities are increasingly multiracial environments, and a full understanding of the politics of race must account for this. Accordingly, scholars have responded to these trends with an increased interest in the manner in which minority groups relate to one another, and whether or not those relations are characterized by interracial conflict or cooperation (for a review of recent studies see Meier, McClain, Wrinkle, and Polinard, 2004). The extent to which inter-minority relations are dominated by collaboration or discord holds considerable implications for the formation of rainbow coalitions and the general political process in a variety of urban settings.

Black – Latino Relations

Numerous studies have examined the way racial/ethnic groups interact with one another. Recent work has focused on how these interactions differ under various circumstances. For example, when a political scenario is viewed within a zero-sum context (that is, the political benefits under question are limited), we would anticipate a higher level of inter-ethnic discord. When removed from a zero-sum context, however, this relationship should be characterized by increased degrees of cooperation (Meier et al. 2004).

Despite this, inter-minority relations remain heavily influenced by a variety of other factors. de la Garza (1997, 453) suggests that several points are likely responsible for the inability of Latinos and African-Americans to form numerous and long-lasting rainbow coalitions. These include:

> 1) resentment among many blacks over Latino access to affirmative action programs that blacks believe were designed for them 2) tensions because of the perception that immigration results in job displacement and the reallocation of public resources to Latinos rather than to blacks and 3) battles over reapportionment and redistricting. Population is the foundation for allocating legislative seats. The numbers of state legislative seats is fixed, while the number of congressional seats allocated to each state may vary as a result of the census. In cities with substantial Latino and black populations, these groups often live in juxtaposition. Where Latino population growth greatly exceeds black population growth, any increase in legislative seats designed to accommodate the growth of the Latino population could come at the expense of blacks.

Relying primarily on survey data, the literature thus far has found that support for different coalitional strategies varies with economic conditions, perceived social distance, experiences with discrimination, income, education, group size, age, political integration, and the amount of resources available to each group (Dyer, Vedlitz, and Worchel 1989; Jackson, Gerber, and Cain 1994; McClain 1993; Meier and Stewart 1991a; Garcia 2000). Garcia (2000) finds that Latino support for programs geared towards helping African-Americans increases with education, perception of African-American discrimination, and levels of political attentiveness. Jackson, Gerber, and Cain (1994) note that blacks in Los Angles report feeling "close" to Latinos when compared to national figures. Age is also a positive influence on support for political

strategies that would foster inter-racial cooperation. As with most previous research, socioeconomic status positively affects support for Latino–African-American coalitions.

Aside from the demographic characteristics that facilitate or hamper efforts to form multi-racial coalitions, a number of social and structural variables influence the process. Perceived social distance is perhaps the most often studied of these influences (Dyer, Vedlitz, and Worchel 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991a). Meier and Stewart (1991a) point out that while ideological similarity might aid in the creation of rainbow coalitions, elevated levels of social distance make such an outcome unlikely.

Based upon a survey of 1,200 Texas residents, Dyer, Vedlitz, and Worchel (1989) note that for most types of social interaction, especially interactions that require the formation of a substantial permanent relationship (i.e. intermarriage), both African-Americans and Latinos preferred to associate with Anglos. Similarly, Jackson, Gerber, and Cain (1994) find that African-Americans nationally are much more likely to identify with Anglos than with Latinos. A sample they drew from the Los Angles area generated comparable results.

The presence of social distance is compounded by the unique ethnic situation in which Latinos find themselves. As the U.S. Census form indicates, Latinos (or Hispanics, to use Census terminology) are technically "white" yet constitute a unique subgroup within that categorization. Munoz and Henry (1986, 607) observe that, "most Latino political leaders have historically promoted a white identity for Latinos and this has contributed to a lack of interest in building rainbow coalitions." This approach also does not consider the difficulties that may arise when Latinos are considered in non-pan-

ethnic terms. Thus, while political ideology would seem to lead minorities to form rainbow coalitions, social distance may lead to the formation of alternative coalitional arrangements.

In their examination of this topic, Meier and Stewart (1991b) find that there is a tradeoff between African-Americans and Latinos in terms of beneficial education policies. Yet, other studies find that inter-minority coalitions have formed in order to contend with problems shared by the African-American and Latino communities, such as poor socioeconomic conditions. Moreover, coalitions have also been observed for potential "wedge issues," such as immigration (Estrada, Garcia, Marcias, and Maldonado 1981; Browning Marshall and Tabb 1984; Espiritu 1992).

Taking this previous literature into account, one might expect inter-minority relations to be characterized in several different ways. Borrowing from the three possible scenarios articled in McClain's (1993, McClain and Karnig 1990) work in this areas, there are three general ways in which the political success of African-Americans can affect Latinos and vise versa:

Inter-Minority Cooperation: Gains by African Americans in terms of public policy and political representation increase along with gains made by the Latino community and vise versa.

Inter-Minority Conflict: Alternatively, gains by African-Americans in terms of public policy and political representation come at the expense of gains made by Latinos and vise versa.

Inter-Minority Independence: Gains made by one group are unrelated to gains made by the other.

While this literature attempts to uncover which one if these general scenarios best characterizes African-American – Latino relations over a host of political activities and policy domains, this project is confined to a single policy domain, education. The following chapter presents a political theory of the education process which has been tested by numerous scholars and multiple points in time. It then discusses how this framework can be adapted to a discussion of African-American and Latino cooperation and conflict.

CHAPTER II

EDUCATION POLICY AND BLACK/LATINO COOPERATION AND CONFLICT

As of 2000 nearly 21% of all African-American elected officials served on school boards (Joint Center 2000). Meanwhile, a plurality of Latino elected officials, 42%, held such positions (NALEO 2000). In Illinois, well over 90% of all Latino elected officials were school board members. This is partially a consequence of the substantial amount of minority political efforts for incorporation which have been concentrated in areas where the costs of entry are relatively low, such as school boards. For example, when Mexican-Americans in south Texas spilt with the Democrats in the 1970s to form the La Raza Unida Party, they specifically targeted their efforts at attempting to gain access to city council and school board seats. José Ángel Gutiérrez, a co-founder of the RUP, objected to organizing and fielding candidates for state and federal offices, arguing that such a move would be an inefficient use of the RUP's limited resources (Garcia 1989). Indeed, the greatest substantive impact which the RUP had on the lives of Mexican-Americans in south Texas came a result of their takeover of local bodies, such as the school board of Crystal City ISD (Montejano 1987).

An examination of the relationships between African-Americans and Latinos serving on local school boards, therefore, speaks not only to the primary political actors within the education policymaking process, but also to the behavior of a large number of minority politicians generally. Moreover, the racial dynamics which appear in school boards are also likely to foreshow dynamics in other local, stated, and even federal governing bodies.

Education and Minority Success in the United States

Besides low costs of entry, school boards and the education system have been a focus of minority activists because of the substantive importance of which education has for the lives of racial and ethnic minorities. Education policy permeates every other policy domain. In their work, *Race, Class, and Education*, Meier, Stewart and England (1989, 10) argue, "education is the single most important area in terms of racial discrimination." Sustaining this statement is the pervasiveness of disparate treatment for African-Americans and Latinos throughout the history of American education (Clotfelter 2004; Howe 1997; Kozol 1991; Orfield and Eaton1996; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Moses 2002; Oakes 1985; San Miguel 1986, 2001; Valenzuela 1999; Woodson 1933) and the negative and long-lasting consequences which result from receiving an inadequate education. Put simply, denying individuals that right to a quality education affects every other aspect of their life, and minority activists have thus made equality within the educational system a high priority (see San Miguel 1986).

Using data from a national sample of school districts, Table 2.1 illustrates the impact of education on income for racial and ethnic minorities. We see that African-American per capita income within a district increases by $210.30 with every one point increase in the percent of African-American high school graduates. High school education alone can explain 13% of the variance in African-American income. Latinos, however, appear to be less able to translate their educational attainment into increased income, likely due to the additional obstacles which Latinos face beyond their status as a ethnic minority, such as citizenship status. According to Table 2.2, a one point increase

in the percent of Latino high school graduates within a district is associated with an increase in Latino per capita income of $122.60. Education, however, does explain slightly more of the variance in per capita income for Latinos relative to African-Americans (21% to 13% respectively). Together, these finding complement other work (e.g. Cohen and Tyree 1986), who demonstrate, at the individual level, the higher levels of education tend to be coupled with greater economic success.

Table 2.1
Impact of African-American Education on African-American Income
OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable = African-American Per Capita Income

		t-score
% African-American High School Graduates	$210.30	16.42
Intercept	-4304.21	
R^2	0.13	
N	1769	
F	269.54	

Table 2.2
Impact of Latino Education on Latino Income
OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable = Latino Per Capita Income

		t-score
% Latino High School Graduates	$122.60	21.64
Intercept	2166.14	
R^2	0.21	
N	1786	
F	468.4	

Similarly, education reduces poverty rates for both African-Americans and Latinos. With every one point increase in the percent of African-American high school graduates, the percentage of African-Americans living in poverty within a district drops by .48%. Likewise, with every one point increase in the percent of Latino high school graduates, the percentage of Latinos living in poverty within a district drops by .37%. Once again, education proves to be a robust predictor of economic status, explaining over 20% of the variance for both African-Americans and Latinos. To offer two extreme (and admittedly unrealistic) examples, the model presented in Table 2.3 suggests that in a district in which no African-Americans held a high school diploma, 50.08% of African-Americans would be living in poverty. However, were every African-American within a district a high school graduate, only 6.08% of African-Americans would be impoverished. Table 2.4 shows that poverty among the Latinos would fall from 40.29% to 3.29% as the level of education among Latinos moved with its smallest to its highest possible value.

Table 2.3
Impact of African-American Education on African-American Poverty
OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable = % African-Americans Living in Poverty

		t-score
% African-American High School Grauates	-0.48	-25.51
Intercept	54.08	
R^2	0.27	
N	1743	
F	650.73	

Table 2.4
Impact of Latino Education on Latino Poverty
OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable = % Latino Living in Poverty

		t-score
% Latino High School Grauates	-0.37	-23.45
Intercept	40.29	
R^2	0.24	
N	1784	
F	549.93	

Having illustrated the extent to which education affects the quality of life for African-Americans and Latinos, we see that minorities have a variety of incentives to ensure that they maximize their influence on the education system. This is typically done through the election of minorities to local school boards. Doing so, however, requires substantial resources, the most obvious of which is group size. Previous research finds that African-Americans are relatively successful at translating group size

into access to school boards seats. In fact, Meier, Stewart, and England (1989) find that, within the average school district in their sample, African-Americans are proportionally represented on local school board given their population size. Latinos, for reasons discussed in later chapters, suffer from under representation on most boards. Meier and Stewart's (1991a) study estimates this under representation to be around 15%.

Electoral success, of course, is also contingent upon socioeconomic conditions. The conversion of minority group size into minority political office holding requires electoral participation, and therefore, socioeconomic resources (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995). Region can also be a crucial factor. This is most noticeable for African-Americans, who generally are at an electoral disadvantage in South (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989). Since the passage of the Voting Rights Act, significant scholarly attention has also been paid to the effect of electoral structure on minority electoral success, with most studies finding that at-large elections reduce levels of minority representation (Arrington and Watts 1991; Engstrom and McDonald 1986; Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Meier, Gonzalez-Juenke, Wrinkle, and Polinard 2005; Robinson and Dye 1978; Robinson and England 1981). These relationships can be summarized in Figure 2.1

Borrowing from a similar set of investigations with the urban political tradition, scholars of education politics have repeatedly demonstrated that increased descriptive representation for minority groups on local school boards results in greater share of administrative positions within a district (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1990; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998), similar to the way

Figure 2.1
A Model of Minority Access to School Board Seats



in which representation on city councils has been found to increase the percentage of minority municipal employees (Dye and Renick 1981; Kerr and Mladenka 1994; Mladenka 1989a, 1989b). While most school board's only direct administrative hire is the superintendent, boards can also put forward formal policies or informal pressure to encourage the hiring of additional minority administrators. Minority administrators, in turn, can use their discretion to hire more minority teachers.

Like minority representation on school boards, environmental influences are also likely to have a considerable impact on the presence of minorities within the education bureaucracy. First, minorities must be present within the local labor market, which requires group size as well as socioeconomic resources (specifically as college degree). Population growth rates can also be a crucial factor in minority employment within the education system; this issue is particularly important for Latinos. Employment patterns are inertial, and may represent patterns of political empowerment and residency form

previous times. Relatively new groups are at a disadvantage, therefore, and must rely on replacements or the expansion of positions in order to exercise their newfound influence on public employment patterns. In other words, without high employee turnover, the ability of district to adapt and reflect the current demographic make up of a district will be restricted, thus lowering the degree to which population size appears to predict employment within the for emerging populations. Figure 2.2 offers an illustration of these relationships.

Once employed, minorities have the ability to directly affect policy outputs and outcomes. Drawing on insights from the representative bureaucracy literature, which argues that descriptive representation within organizations leads to the active representation of a group's interests (Hindera 1993a, 1993b; Selden 1997; Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998), several studies have sought to determine the

Figure 2.2
A Model of Minority Access to Administrative and Teaching Positions



consequences of increased diversity among teachers for the education of minority students. Specifically, work in this area has attempted to uncover whether there exists a link between the presence of minority teachers and the use of academic grouping and discipline in a discriminatory manner so that students from one racial/ethnic group are separated from another, a set of practices or informal policies often referred to as "second-generation discrimination." Generally, these studies find that levels of second generation discrimination are lower in districts where minorities comprise a large share of the teaching faculty (Barajas and Pierce 2001; Irvine 1989; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1990; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Meier 1995; Weiher 2000; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998). Researchers in this area have also moved beyond questions of overt discrimination by examining the ramification of teacher diversity on other policy outputs, such as student performance on standardized testing (Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999; Weiher 2000).

Meier and Stewart (1992) demonstrate that the effect of minority employment on second-generation discrimination occurs primarily through the hiring of minority teachers, not administrators, confirming Thompson's (1976) contention that the translation of descriptive representation into substantive representation is most likely to occur at the "street-level" where bureaucrats enjoy considerably more discretion and have been subject to less organizational socialization.

The amount of discretion teachers possess is also likely to be a function of school district size. Larger school districts are assumed to be more professionalized (see Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991a; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998). Greater professionalization should result in a greater resistance toward using academic groupings for purposes other than their original educational function, such as second generation discrimination.

Once again, there is reason to suspect that socioeconomic conditions are a prime determinant of minority wellbeing within the education system. Discrimination, such as academic grouping or this misuse of disciplinary policies, is easier to perpetrate against individuals with few socioeconomic resources and serves to limit the extent to which hostile attitudes can be translated into discriminatory behavior, as minority groups will be more apt to challenge discriminatory behavior through political or legal means.

A final explanation of discriminatory education policies within US school districts is racial/ethnic heterogeneity (Hero 1998; Hero and Tolbert 1996; Oswald, Coutinho, and Best 2002; St. John and Lewis 1971). Hero's (1998; Hero and Tolbert 1996) work on the influence of racial/ethnic diversity and public policy suggests that diversity is likely to be positively related to educational equity. As Hero (1998, 101) writes, "where small minority populations are present minorities often have high disparate outcomes, and those disparate outcomes may actually be relatively higher in more homogenous environments." He argues that this occurs because homogeneous environments are characterized by "consensual pluralism," and political disputes are

unlikely revolve around issues of racial/ethnic equity. These relationships can be summarized in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3
A Model of Minority Second Generation Discrimination



This explanation of minority student outcomes heavily emphasizes the importance of achieving descriptive representation at each level of the educational system (see Figure 2.4). Increases in representation at one level of authority, according to this framework, translates into representation at other levels. At the lowest level of the system, teachers in the classroom with students, this descriptive representation positively influences the fortunes of minority students. Work in the field of education provides a variety of causal mechanisms for this relationship. Minority teachers can

Figure 2.4
A Model of Minority Access within the US Education System



serve as role models for minority students, but may also increase minority student success through increased expectations and a greater eagerness of students to meet those expectations (Irvine 1989). Teachers, the "street-level bureaucrats" of the education system, also enjoy considerable discretion in the implementation of policies, providing a way though which they can also influence policy outcomes, such as those related to second generation discrimination, for minority students. In sum, this framework

suggests that student outcomes for racial and ethnic minorities are a function of minority representation among teaching faculties and lower-level administration. The representation, then, is partially determined by presence of minority representation at higher levels of administration. Ultimately, electoral politics and the ability of minorities to gain access to seats on local school boards influence the hiring of administrators, and consequently, indirectly influence minority student outcomes. Each one of these stages can potentially be an arena for African-American and Latino cooperation or conflict. I elaborate on this point below.

Inter-Minority Relations and the Politics of Education

As Cohen and Tyree (1986, 812) write, "while education helps most of us get ahead economically, its value for children of poverty is particularly great." Consequently, the extent to which African-American - Latino relations in the education system are characterized by cooperation or conflict holds considerable implications for the future of both groups. Education, however, is a forum in which inter-minority relations have been characterized as tenuous within recent years (de la Garza 1997; Hero and Clarke 2003; Meier and Stewart 1991a, 1991b; Meier, McClain, Wrinkle, and Polinard 2004; Sidney 2002; Vaca 2004). In other policy arenas both Latinos and African-Americans are likely to benefit from redistributive policies. However, within the educational system redistributing resources to Latino-targeted programs, such as bilingual education, often limits the resources available to African-Americans and other non-Latino students.

Referring specifically to the education policymaking process, Hero and Clarke (2003, 326) argue that "Latinos and blacks bring different experiences and preferences…so the prospects of multiethnic coalitions are tenuous." Similarly, de la Garza (1997) maintains that school reform is one of four prime causes of political tension between the African-American and Latino communities within recent years. Despite such highly conflictual portrayals of the education policymaking process, it would be disingenuous to imply that the vast majority of school board decisions are contentious and divisive. Rather, most of the issues taken up by school boards, as with other forms of local government, are resolved by unanimous or near-unanimous votes (Polinard, Wrinkle, Longoria, and Binder 1994). Thus, while race may not shape every deliberation undertaken by local governing institutions, where issues (e.g. funding for bilingual education) are framed in racial/ethnic terms, contention and voting blocs are likely to form.

Thus, the first opportunity for competition or cooperation occurs in electoral settings. Elected representatives, in turn, have the option to either develop a cooperative relationship with other minority groups, or to seek to maximize benefits for their co-ethnics at the expense of other groups. Borrowing the framework illustrated in Figure 2.5, we see that this is can be done through the discretion they possess in setting general policy goals and selecting high-level bureaucratic administrators. Administrators, in turn, develop more specific policies and hire street-level bureaucrats (teachers) who actually implement policies and produce policy outputs. The bureaucracy, then, presents another forum where African-American and Latino competition or cooperation can

Figure 2.5
Possible Points of African-American and Latino Cooperation and Conflict within the Education Policymaking Process



occur. Administrators can use their discretion in hiring and developing specific policies to maximize benefits for specific co-ethnics or for multiple racial/ethnic minorities. The same is true for street-level bureaucrats. The dynamic of Black/Brown relations,

however, can conceivably differ dramatically within the bureaucracy, and each of these potential points of conflict or cooperation warrant individual attention.

Accordingly, each chapter in this project examines one of these junctions. Chapter III begins with an examination of whether African-Americans and Latinos tend to form coalitions with one another in the election local school board members. In *Protest is not Enough*, Browning, Marchall, and Tabb (1984) argue that Latino representation is improved by the formation of coalitions with African-Americans and liberal Anglos. However, much of the literature has noted a surprising absence of such rainbow coalitions, and only limited attitudinal support for their formation (Dyer et al. 1989; de la Garza 1997; Garcia 2000; Mindiola 2002). Meier and Stewart (1991a) maintain that this is an anticipated consequence of the "power thesis," which suggests that the level of social distance between racial/ethnic groups determines the likelihood that the groups will enter into a coalitional relationship or one of electoral competition. Meier and Stewart (1991a) go on to argue that, "if the dominant Anglo group is forced to chose between Hispanic and black groups for coalition purposes, the power thesis suggests that, all things being equal, they will seek a coalition with Hispanics." However, the findings here suggest that, contrary to the predictions of the power thesis, there is little evidence of Anglo-Latino coalitions. There are, however, indications that Anglo-black coalitions may form when an area becomes increasingly populated by Latino non-citizens, possibly due to the increased social distance this causes between Latinos and other racial/ethnic communities. Lastly, nonpartisan systems are

characterized by greater degrees of inter-minority electoral competition than are partisan systems.

Chapter IV seeks to determine whether African-American – Latino relations are characterized by cooperation or conflict in the translation of political representation into bureaucratic office holdings. Competition over descriptive representation within the bureaucracy is one of the most studied areas within the literature on inter-minority relations (McClain and Karnig 1990; McClain 1993; Meier et al. 2004). It is also among the most prominent issues concerning inter-minority relations in the educational system. de la Garza (1997) claims "tensions resulting from Latino population growth that produces Latino majorities in schools that previously had black majorities, administrators and staff" to be among the four main explanations for the failure of long-lasting rainbow coalitions to materialize in recent years. McClain (1993) finds evidence that representational gains on the part of African-Americans are likely to negatively affect Latinos, while gains made by Latinos do not necessarily limit African-American opportunities. McClain (1993; McClain and Karnig 1990; McClain and Tauber 1998), however, models African-American and Latino competition for municipal employment through a series of simple and partial correlations, which only allows her to test whether municipalities with a larger number of African-American employees tend to employ less Latinos and vice versa. McClain's study does not consider how minority political representation affects the municipal employment of other minority groups, so no conclusions can be drawn regarding African-American and Latino legislative cooperation. Chapter III takes up this question. More succinctly, it asks if the positive

effects of African-American representation strengthened, weakened, or unaffected by the presence of Latino representation? Conversely, are the positive effects of Latino representation strengthened, weakened, or unaffected by the presence of African-American representation? Examining these questions also makes an important advancement beyond the simple covariance models used in other works. Within education, this is done by examining whether African-Americans and Latinos are better or less able to substantively represent their group's interest on school boards on which both groups serve. The findings offer no evidence that the hiring of African-Americans administrators is affected by the presence of Latinos on the board. However, Latino political representation has less of a positive impact on the percentage of Latino administrators when Latinos serve on boards alongside African-Americans. For reasons discussed in Chapter III, this relationship is also not as straightforward as it would initially appear.

Chapter V turns to actually policy outcomes and the street-level of the American education system, examining how African-American – Latino relations affect levels of "second-generation discrimination" among minority students. The educational system provides an excellent opportunity to test for the presence of African-American/Latino competition in policy implementation due to the considerable amount of discretion and autonomy that teachers and administrators enjoy. This chapter produces two primary findings. First, it reaffirms that notion that racial discrimination is contingent upon socioeconomic status. When minority groups look similar to Anglos in terms of socioeconomic status, the level of discrimination they face within the education system

is reduced. However, the relative status of other minority groups matters as well. When the difference between African-Americans and Anglos is large and the difference between Latinos and Anglos is small, African-Americans are especially vulnerable. The same holds true for Latinos when the African-Americans find themselves relatively better off in terms of income and education. Second, this study extends the literature on representative bureaucracy by examining whether minority students benefit from the presence of non-co-ethnic minorities on teaching faculties. Surprisingly, the findings suggest that not only do non-co-ethnic minority teachers lower levels of second generation discrimination among minority students; they do so consistently and with a substantive impact that occasionally rivals that of co-ethnic teachers.

The National Latino Education Study

The bulk of the data for this study are taken from the National Latino Education Study, a national sample of school districts conducted in 2001. The National Latino Education Study contains information on the racial/ethnic composition of school boards as well as the electoral system used to elect members, such as the presence of at-large or ward elections. It also contains information about the demographic makeup of each district's employees. The NLES surveyed every school district in the nation with a student enrollment over 5000 and yielded a response rate of 96%. This results in a total sample of 1831 districts across 49 states, 1672 of which elect their board members. The size and geographic diversity of this sample presents a substantial improvement over samples used in previous studies. For example, Fraga et al.'s (1986) sample size is 35 districts, Marschall's (2005) is 196, Meier and Stewart's (1991a) is 118, and Polinard et

al.'s (1994) is 64, Robinson and England's (1981) is 75, and Welch and Karnig's (1978) is 43.

Data regarding the demographic makeup of each school district is obtained from the 2000 census. Census data includes the racial composition of the district, the average level of socioeconomic resources (e.g. educational attainment, income, and home ownership) present in each community by race. It also contains information about the citizenship status of district residents.

The Office for Civil Rights gathers periodic data regarding academic grouping, discipline, and educational attainment. Unfortunately, the OCR typically collects data from a small sample of districts nationwide. In 2000, however, the OCR conducted a national sample, gathering multiple measures of student performance by race. Combining the National Latino Education Study with Census and OCR data makes it possible to trace African-American – Latino relations from the electoral arena through the bureaucracy and the implementation stage.

Table 2.5 offers some descriptive statistics for the set of districts included in the survey. The mean African-American population is 10.44%, slightly under their overall population size as of 2000. Latinos represent 13% of the population in the average district in this study. Minority populations tend to be young, and we see that demonstrated in the data, with the average district having a student population which is 15.4% African-American and 15.6% Latino.

Latinos appear to be doing far less well than African-Americans in terms of teaching positions, with African-Americans representing 7.1% of all teachers within the

average districts, compared to 5.37% for Latinos. This difference is even more pronounced for administrators, where African African-Americans comprise 10.36% of

Table 2.5
Some Characteristics of the Districts Included in this Study

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation
Total Student Enrollment	16701.06	37862.36
% Blacks Living in the District	10.44	14.11
% Latinos Living in the District	12.95	18.40
% Blacks with a High School Diploma	73.28	16.30
% Latinos with a High School Diploma	66.10	17.90
% Blacks Living in Poverty	18.98	14.53
% Latinos Living in Poverty	15.71	13.68
% Black Students	15.42	19.93
% Latino Students	15.66	22.19
% Black Teachers	7.10	11.83
% Latino Teachers	5.37	11.80
% Black Administrators	10.36	15.38
% Latino Administrators	5.58	13.09
% Black School Board Members	10.23	16.79
% Latino School Board Members	5.67	16.23

all administrators within the average districts, compared to 5.58% for Latinos. That African-Americans and Latinos seem to be better represented among administrators than teachers is also a trend worth noting.

The advantage which African-Americans enjoy over Latinos in terms of employment within the education system may be a function of a greater level of political incorporation. The average district has a school board in which African-Americans make up 10.23% of the members, while Latino incorporation is a substantially lower 5.67%.

Conclusion

My hope is that this project will allow for a more complete understanding of how the dynamics of African-American – Latino relations shift in accordance with the differing actors and incentives for cooperation that exist at various stages of the policymaking process. Indeed, this is the first work to trace inter-minority relations from the electoral arena through to the policy implementation process. Other works (e.g. Meier and Stewart 1991a) have examined similar questions at multiple stages of the policy process; however, inter-minority relations have never been the prime focus of any such study. Moreover, this study will utilize a dataset which is relatively recent and more comprehensive than that which previous research has relied on.

The setting of this work in the educational system makes it one of substantial importance. Equality of education is an especially salient issue to normative theorists and political activists. Few, if any, bureaucracies affect the lives of individuals to the same extent as public schools. Inter-minority relations in this arena are likely to set the

stage for relations in other political settings, such social welfare policies. Nonetheless, my hope is also this work will speak to scholars beyond the field of education policy, such as those in urban politics who have historically been greatly concerned with the delivery of governmental services (policy implementation) and electoral relationships.

CHAPTER III

INTERRACIAL COALITIONS IN LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD ELECTIONS

This chapter attempts to improve upon our understanding of the nature of inter-minority coalitions in the election of the chief policymakers within the U.S. education system, school board members. Specific attention is paid to the "power thesis," a hypothesis first proposed by Meier and Stewart (1991a, 1991b) that predicts the failure of rainbow coalitions and the formation of Anglo-Latino coalitions. Additionally, the influence of structural variables on the formation of interracial coalitions is reexamined, with the primary emphasis placed on the presence of partisan elections.

The Logic behind Interracial Coalitions

As discussed in the introduction, inter-minority relations are heavily influenced by a variety of factors. Once again, de la Garza (1997, 453) points to several conditions which he argues have contributed to the inability of Latinos and African-Americans to form numerous and long-lasting rainbow coalitions. These include resentment among many African-Americans over Latino access to affirmative action programs, the perception that immigration results in job displacement and the reallocation of public resources to Latinos rather than to African-Americans, battles over reapportionment and redistricting, and tensions resulting from Latino population growth that produces Latino majorities in schools that previously had African-American majorities, administrators and staff. Paula McClain's research has long noted the existence of socioeconomic and political competition between African-Americans and Latinos (McClain and Karning 1990; McClain 1993; McClain and Tauber 1998, 2001). Her work in this area suggests

that representational gains on the part of African-Americans are likely to affect Latinos negatively, although gains made by Latinos do not necessarily limit African-American opportunities (McClain 1993).

Despite such findings, which seem to point to the presence of inter-minority competition in a number of localities within the United States, there remains an elegant and compelling logic as to why one would expect rainbow coalitions to form in a variety of circumstances. In *Protest is not Enough*, for example, Browning, Marchall, and Tabb (1984) argue that Latino representation is improved by the formation of coalitions with African-Americans and liberal Anglos. Forming rainbow coalitions allows African-Americans and Latinos to inflate their electoral strength, gain office, and promote policies in the interest of both groups. Refusing to form such coalitions carries with it the risk that conservative Anglos will dominate governing coalitions, resulting in policies hostile to the interests of minority groups.

Given that the literature on African-American – Latino relations has noted a surprising absence of rainbow coalitions (see Vaca 2004), scholars have been left to wonder why alternate racial coalitions routinely form. One such explanation comes from the sociological concept of "perceived social distance." In its simplest form, social distance refers to the amount and nature of social relationships that members of two groups are willing to engage in and is often measured using survey questions similar to those first employed by Bogardus (1928).[1]

[1] Bogardus's social distance scale asks respondents the following survey item: "Which best represents your comfort level in interacting with this social group 1) Close kinship

Work dealing with the concept of social distance indicates that African-Americans and Latinos rarely possess attitudes conducive to inter-minority affability and social networks. Latinos are usually more likely to favor social association with Anglos and Anglos typically reciprocate. This is especially true for more intimate forms of association, such as intermarriage (Dyer, Vedlitz, and Worchel 1989).

Of course, interracial attitudes, including those comprising measures of social distance, vary considerably in different social and economic contexts. For this reason, researchers argue that the influence of race on social distance can be either exacerbated or mitigated by socioeconomic conditions. When the Latino community is similar to the Anglo community in terms of socioeconomic status, the argument suggests that African-Americans become less desirable coalition partners (Meier and Stewart 1991a, 1991b; Kaufmann 2004). There are also some indications that the reverse is true. That is, when the Latino community does not possess ample socioeconomic resources, African-Americans may benefit from a more collegial relationship with the local Anglo population (Randall and Delbridge 2005). In short, social distance is partially determined by a group's social status generally and is therefore heavily influenced by socioeconomic factors.

Utilizing arguments made in the social distance literature, Giles and Evans' (1985, 1986) present what they term the "power thesis," which suggests that the amount

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by marriage 2) My Club as Personal Chums (often modified in contemporary surveys as "Close Friendship") 3) Neighbors on my street 4) Employment in my occupation 5) Citizenship in the country 6) Visitors only to my country 7) Would exclude from my country."

of social distance between two individuals determines their willingness to engage in cooperative or competitive behavior. Meier and Stewart (1991a, 1991b; also see Feagin 1980) extend their logic and develop an aggregated version of this hypothesis. The Meier and Stewart hypothesis argues that the level of social distance between racial/ethnic groups determines whether groups will enter into a coalitional relationship or one in which they compete for electoral representation and beneficial public policies. Thus, Meier and Stewart argue that social distance not only explains social relationships between groups but also affects the *political* behavior of groups toward one another.

Viewed from the perspective of the power thesis, it is not unexpected that much of the literature has noted an absence of rainbow coalitions and only limited attitudinal support for their formation (Dyer et al. 1989; de la Garza 1997; Garcia 2000; Mindiola 2002). As Meier and Stewart (1991a, 100) suggest, "if the dominant Anglo group is forced to choose between Hispanic and black groups for coalition purposes, the power thesis suggests that, all things being equal, they will seek a coalition with Hispanics." Similar observations regarding Anglo preferences for coalition partners continue to be made in more contemporary studies, such as Kaufmann's (2004) work on the interplay between racial conflict and mayoral voting in American cities. She writes:

> For moderate whites, Latinos are simply more attractive coalition partners. For Latinos, these alliances have resulted in greater levels of political influence and incorporation than they might have otherwise had in black-led coalitions…The big losers in these new political arrangements between Latinos and moderate whites have been urban blacks, who become quite dispensable to these governing regimes (205-206).

Hypotheses

Empirically, however, it is difficult to distinguish between each of the possible scenarios. For example, the presence of a rainbow coalition would imply that as the size of the African-American population within an area grows, Latino representation would likewise increase (for the rainbow coalition should be wielding greater electoral strength). Yet, the power thesis predicts a similar set of results, but for very different reasons. That is, as the size of the African-American population increases Anglos have a greater incentive to form coalitions with Latinos. Thus, once again, we would expect to see Latino representation increase as a result of an increase in the size of the African-American population.

Fortunately, the two hypotheses do make substantially different predictions regarding the relationship between the size of the Latino population and African-American representation. If a rainbow coalition is present, an increase in the Latino population should naturally increase the degree to which African-Americans are represented (once again, the coalition's electoral strength is growing). Conversely, if the power thesis is correct, we would expect to see a negative relationship between Latino population size and African-American representation. This occurs because Anglos will not be inclined to form coalitions with African-Americans but will take advantage of the

presence of a sizeable Latino population to limit African-American opportunities.[2] This leads to the following hypotheses:

Black-Latino (Rainbow) Coalition:

African-American population size is positively associated with Latino representation in elected office.

Latino population size is positively associated with African-American representation in elected office.

Anglo-Latino Coalition (Power Thesis):

African-American population size is positively associated with Latino representation in elected office.

Latino population size is negatively associated with African-American representation in elected office.

Neither scenario predicts that African-American population size will be *negatively* associated with Latino representation in elected office (that is, the formation of an Anglo-black coalition). However, drawing on the framework set up by the power thesis and evidence presented by scholars of Latino immigration, there might be reason to suspect that Anglo-black coalitions are possible. The power thesis' applicability to

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[2] These predictions are laid out by Meier and Stewart (1991a) who write: "the key test for choosing between the rainbow thesis and the power thesis is what happens to black representation when Latino numbers increase. The power thesis holds that an increase in Latino population would be unlikely to increase Anglo votes for blacks, because blacks are less similar to Anglos than are Latinos. The relationship between Latino population and black representation in this case should be negative. The rainbow thesis, on the other hand, contends that as Latino population increases, the potential for a rainbow coalition increases. The correlation between Latino population and black representation, therefore, should be positive (1128)."

Anglo-Latino coalitions assumes conflict is a function of the level of social distance between groups and that Anglos will be most likely to seek a coalition with the group or groups which most resemble themselves (typically assumed to be Latinos). Yet, how have these traditional relationships been changed by recent immigration tends? With the size of the foreign born population increasing by 43% between 1990 and 2000 (Jones-Correa 2001), scholars have begun to examine how coalitional relationships are altered by the infusion of a large Latino immigrant population.

Latino Immigration and the Power Thesis

Based upon a series of interviews with Houston residents, Mindiola et al. (2002, 61) present anecdotal evidence that Latino immigrants sometimes believe Anglo-black coalitions to be more likely than Anglo-Latino coalitions due to the cultural and linguistic differences between Anglos and Latino immigrants. This serves as an illustration of an alternative to the traditional predictions of the power thesis, suggesting that Anglo-Latino social distance may occasionally be greater than Anglo-black social distance, resulting in the occasional formation of Anglo-black political coalitions.

Several other studies have examined how immigration influences Anglo and African-American attitudes toward new immigrant populations, especially Latinos. For example, Sears et al. (1999) find that African-Americans are more likely to oppose

liberal immigration policies if they sense economic competition with Latinos.[3] Regarding Anglo behavior, Kaufmann (2004) observes that Anglos who believe that local government pays too much attention to recent immigrants were more likely to vote for Giuliani in the 1993 New York mayoral race. This finding remains when she splits her sample to only examine the voting behavior of politically moderate Anglos, although she does not find a relationship between immigration attitudes and voting for Riordan in the Los Angles mayoral race held that same year. Lastly, a recent survey of residents in a North Carolina country with a rapidly growing Latino immigrant population finds that African-Americans and Anglos express lower levels of social distance to each other than they do toward any other group (Randall and Delbridge 2005).[4]

Furthering the predictions of this alternative interpretation of the power thesis are the attitudes of Latino immigrants themselves. For example, Mindiola et al. (2002) find that Latino immigrants often express very negative feelings regarding black-Latino social association. When considered along side other works which suggest that Latinos perceive a greater degree of commonality with African-Americans at higher levels of acculturation (Kaufmann 2003) and that support for coalitional strategies increases with

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[3] Work by Waldinger (2001) suggests that fears related to economic competition with Latinos are well founded. He notes that in many areas Latino immigrants are more likely to find "adequate" employment than African-Americans, possibly due to higher levels of immigrant social capital and the selection bias of individuals inherent in the immigration process.

[4] Previous research by political scientists has found trends similar to those noted by sociologists. For example, Jackson, Gerber, and Cain (1994) note that African-Americans are more likely to perceive themselves to be "close" to Anglos than they are to Latinos.

political integration (Garcia 2000), we have reason to suspect that Latino immigrants will often not be receptive to African-American overtures, should they be made.

The following scenario can be generated from this alternative interpretation of Meier and Stewart's power thesis:

African-American population size will be *negatively* associated with Latino representation in elected office.

Latino population size is *positively* associated with African-American representation in elected office.

More specifically, this revised version of the power thesis argues that:

The size of the Latino **immigrant** population will be *positively* associated with African-American representation in elected office.

This relationship occurs not because Latino immigrants are rallying behind African-American candidates, but rather because Anglos, who perceive Latino immigrants to be socially distant from them, are more likely to incorporate African-Americans into governing coalitions in districts with large Latino immigrant populations.

Modeling African-American and Latino Representation

The data for this study are taken from the National Latino Education Study, a national sample of school districts conducted in 2001, which contains information on the racial/ethnic composition of school boards as well as the electoral system used to elect members. Although the NLES contains a total of of 1831 districts across 49 states, only

1672 elect their board members. The size and geographic diversity of this sample presents a substantial improvement over samples used in previous studies.

As the power thesis focuses on the level of African-American and Latino representation, the dependent variable examined here is the percentage of African-American/Latino school board members. An alternative way to account for the level of minority representation would be the parity (or proportional representation) measure used by, among others, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984). There are several reasons, however, why operationalizing minority representation as the percentage of African-American or Latino board members is preferable to this approach. The parity measure generates the same value for all districts in which there are no minority board members regardless of the size of the minority population (in this instance, all districts receive a score of zero). Thus, the parity measure treats a district in which Latinos hold no seats and constitute 5% of the population the same as a district in which Latinos hold no seats and constitute 50% of the population, even though the cases are qualitatively different from one another. For this reason, Engstrom and McDonald (1981) argue that studies of minority representation on local boards should use the percentage of minority board members as the dependent variable and control for the size of the minority population. They write: "under this approach, proportionality is a relationship across a set of data points, each of which reflects the specific black proportions of the population and the council for a city. The fact that all cities without a black council member do not have the same black population percentage is taken into account in estimating this relationship (346)." Beyond this methodological criticism of the parity measure, there

are theoretical reasons why the Engstrom and McDonald (1981) modeling approach is preferable. Several studies demonstrate that increases in the percentage of minority school board members, regardless of parity, result in a greater level of minority substantive representation (see Fraga et al. 1986; Marschall 2005; Meier and Stewart 1991a; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1990; Polinard et al. 1994; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998). In other words, Latinos should find their substantive interests better represented in a district in which they hold 28% of seats and constitute 27% of the population than in a district in which they hold 14% of seats and constitute 15% of the population (even though parity measure would suggest the opposite). Thus, minorities have an incentive to maximize their level of descriptive representation on the board without concern for their population size.

The primary determinant of minority representation is the size of the minority population. There are three possible measures of population size which could conceivably be used in this analysis, all of which correlate highly with one another (above .97). The first is the size of the African-American and Latino voting age population. While this is an accurate measure of the electorate, it ignores the fact that African-Americans and Latinos are more likely than other groups to have school aged children, and therefore underestimates the number of minorities who have a strong incentive to vote in school board elections. The second is the percentage of African-American and Latino students within a district. One could argue that the school board should reflect the composition of the student body it serves; however, students, by in large, are excluded from the electoral process. Moreover, this measure would inflate the

size of the minority population relative to the actual voting age population. Therefore, I chose to use the percentage of African-Americans and Latinos residing within a district. This measure, because it includes residents who are not yet eligible to vote, results in a number greater than the voting age population, but smaller than student-based measures. Lastly, this measure also allows for greater comparability to past research, most of which has relied on residential population measures in order to predict levels of minority representation on local school boards (see Fraga, Meier, and England 1986; Marschall 2005; Meier and Stewart 1991b; Robinson and Dye 1978; Robinson and England 1981; Welch and Karning 1978; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998). Replicating the analysis with the other possible measures of population size produces similar results in terms of significance and direction. The coefficients for African-American/Latino population size tend to be smaller when the student-based measure is used (which is expected as this measure inflates the size of the population relative to the residential measure) and larger when voting-age population is used in place of residential population (which is expected as this measure deflates the size of the population relative to the residential measure).

The percentage of African-Americans within a district should be positively related to African-American representation on the board. Similarly, Latino population size should determine the share of offices held by Latinos. In addition to controlling for population size, I also account for the percentage of African-Americans/Latinos who hold a college degree, as electoral successes also depends upon the socioeconomic resources available to each community.

Rodriguez (1999) agues that the nature of inter-minority relations varies considerably in different geographic locations. With this in mind, I insert a series of regional control variables into each model. The economic status of the Anglo community should also influence the ability of minorities to achieve their desired level of representation. Minorities are thought to benefit from a high degree of Anglo poverty, as limited Anglo resources restrict the effectiveness of minority repression and place the groups on a more level playing field (Stewart, England, and Meier 1989).

A long stream of literature analyzes how electoral structure influences minority representation. Generally, these studies find that the presence of ward, or single-member district, systems facilitate minority representation (Arrington and Watts 1991; Engstrom and McDonald 1986; Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Meier, Gonzalez-Juenke, Wrinkle, and Polinard 2005; Robinson and Dye 1978; Robinson and England 1981). Wards boost levels of minority representation because districts are typically drawn along racial lines. This effectively guarantees the election of minorities from certain districts. Under at-large arrangements, prospective minority officials must face an electorate that is usually predominately Anglo.[5]

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[5] Increases in the population size of racial/ethnic minorities, as well as Anglo residential patterns, have resulted in creation of several "Majority-Minority" school districts. In MM districts, the influence of electoral structure on levels of minority representation may differ considerably from its influence in non-MM districts. Nonetheless, it is important to note that in the average district included in this sample both Latinos and African-Americans remain a minority. The mean percentage of Latinos within a district is 13%, while the average for African-Americans is 10%. Latinos constitute a minority in 94% of all districts included in the sample, while African-Americans constitute a minority in 97% of all districts. Nevertheless, dummy variables are used in order to control for the effect of majority African-American or Latino districts.

A second structural variable which must be considered is the presence of partisan elections. While in most circumstances the presence of partisanship is a given, the focus of this present study, school boards, usually has non-partisan elections, making this structural variable a probable determinate of representation. On average, nonpartisan systems tend to benefit Anglo business-class candidates (Davidson and Fraga 1988). Robinson and Dye (1978) find that levels of African-American representation on school boards are modestly increased under partisan systems. Karning and Welch (1980), however, find that partisan elections are associated with a lower number of African-American candidates in city council elections, although it has little bearing on the actual level of African-American representation. Previous work has also suggested that race-based voting is facilitated by non-partisan elections (Pomper 1966; Gordon 1970). In the absence of partisanship, race may become an increasingly important cue in determining vote choice. Moreover, partisan identification often competes with racial sentiments, leading liberal Anglos, Latinos, and African-Americans to vote for the same candidate irrespective of the candidate's race or ethnicity. In this vein, Johnson, Farrell, and Guinn (1999) argue that nonpartisan elections and weak Democratic Party organization have contributed to inter-minority tensions in Los Angles. In short, distinct processes likely underlie the dynamics of inter-minority electoral coalitions under these

different arrangements. Therefore, I spilt the sample and perform separate analyses[6] for districts that elect their board members through partisan and non-partisan elections in order to examine the following hypothesis:

Rainbow Coalitions will be more likely to form under partisan electoral systems.

This occurs because there is a structural incentive for liberal minorities to vote for the same candidate irrespective of the candidate's race or ethnicity. Meanwhile, inter-minority competition will be more likely to occur under non-partisan electoral systems. This occurs because individuals are more likely to rely on racial cues which are easier to discern than ideological ones.

Lastly, I control for whether or not a district has a majority African-American or Latino population, expecting that minority representation will generally be higher in such districts (Henig, Hula, Orr, and Pedescleaux 1999). I also separate out districts in which both the African-American and Latino populations are numerical minorities; however, were they to be combined, their population would constitute a numerical majority. These are the districts in which minority populations should have the greatest incentive to form rainbow coalitions. Therefore, I insert a dummy variable for such districts and interact it with the African-American and Latino population measures in order to search for evidence of inter-minority coalitions in such districts.

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[6] Conducting a Chow Test allows me to reject the null hypothesis that the difference between the coefficients in the partisan and non-partisan models is equal to zero. This provides some empirical support for my theoretical contention that distinct processes underlie partisan and non-partisan elections.

Table 3.1
Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation
African-American Population	9.85	13.35
Latino Population	12.99	18.40
Latino Citizen Population	9.49	13.65
Latino Non-Citizen Population	3.49	5.64
% African-Americans who have Graduated from College	15.97	14.14
% Latinos who have Graduated from College	14.29	11.94
% Anglos Living in Poverty	6.03	3.93
Partisan System (0, 1)	13.82	34.52
Single-Member District System (0, 1)	27.53	44.68
Majority African-American Population (0, 1)	2.15	14.50
Majority Latino Population (0, 1)	6.16	24.05
Combined Majority District (0, 1)	3.39	18.10
Northeast (0, 1)	16.15	36.81
Midwest (0, 1)	21.17	40.87
West (0, 1)	27.39	44.61

Findings

Descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this chapter's analysis are presented in Table 3.1. Table 3.2 presents a simple model of the determinants of African-American and Latino representation on school boards under non-partisan systems, and is, to some degree, analogous to Meier and Stewart's (1991b) treatment of this matter. Theoretically, there is reason to suspect correlation among the residuals in the two models presented in Table 3.2. Indeed, the Breusch-Pagan test shows this to be the case ($\chi^2 = 9.709$). Accordingly, Zellner's (1962) seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique is used for estimation.

As expected, representation on school boards is primarily a function of group size. Here a coefficient of 1 represents equal representation (a one percentage point increase in the size of a group's population is associated with a one percentage point increase in that group's level of representation). We see that African-Americans are nearly equally represented (coefficient=.915), while Latinos appear to be slightly underrepresented (coefficient=.671). Both African-Americans and Latinos also benefit from increased levels of Anglo poverty, although Latinos benefit from this more so than African-Americans. As expected, Latino representation is increased by a greater level of education within the Latino community, while ward systems appear to have no effect on the level of Latino or African-American representation. The level of American-American incorporation is generally higher outside of the South. Latinos generally do worse in the Midwest and Northeast. As one might expect, when African-Americans

Table 3.2
Determinants of African-American and Latino School Board Representation in Non-Partisan Elections
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates
Dependent Variable = Percentage of School Board Members That Are:

Independent Variable:	Black	SE	Latino	SE
African-American Population	.915**	(.028)	-.063*	(.028)
Latino Population	.053*	(.026)	.671**	(.029)
% African-Americans who have Graduated from College	-.019	(.019)		
% Latinos who have Graduated from College			.119**	(.025)
% Anglos Living in Poverty	.217**	(.072)	.326**	(.074)
Single-Member District System	.000	(.006)	.000	(.006)
Majority African-American Population	.096**	(.022)	.024	(.023)
Majority Latino Population	-.011	(.018)	.103**	(.019)
Combined Majority District	-.071	(.087)	-.022	(.091)
Combined Majority District X African-American Population	.319^	(.165)	.090	(.171)
Combined Majority District X Latino Population	.092	(.151)	-.117	(.157)
Northeast	.014^	(.008)	-.019*	(.009)
Midwest	.020**	(.007)	-.001	(.007)
West	.009	(.007)	-.036**	(.007)
Constant	-.023*	(.009)	-.055**	(.010)
N	1354		1354	
R^2	0.692		0.685	

Breusch-Pagan test of independence: χ^2 (Probability), 9.709 (.002)
(standard errors in parentheses) ^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01

constitute a majority of the residential population, their level of representation on the local school board is increased. The same holds true for Latinos.

The results presented in Table 3.2 do not support the contention that a larger African-American population will positively influence Latino representation. Rather, the relationship appears to be negative, a result not predicted by either the rainbow coalition or the Meier and Stewart (1991b) hypotheses. The model for African-American representation further challenges the traditional predictions of the power thesis, while seeming to provide some support for the rainbow coalition hypothesis. An increase in the size of the Latino population does modestly increase the level of African-American representation (coefficient =.053). These findings stand in contrast to those of Meier and Stewart (1991b), who found that African-American group size was positively related to Latino representation, while Latino group size was *negatively* related to African-American representation. A few differences are worth noting. First, Meier and Stewart's (1991b) sample was taken in 1986 and consists of 118 districts, while the sample here is of over 1,576 districts. Also, Meier and Stewart use OLS as their estimation technique, where SUR is more appropriate. More importantly, however, Meier and Stewart do not control for the presence of partisan elections. As this chapter will demonstrate, partisanship substantially influences the nature of inter-minority coalition building.

There is also some indication that African-Americans are better able to translate their numbers into representation on local school boards in districts where African-Americans and Latinos constitute a minority of the population but combined make up a

majority. However, there is no evidence of inter-minority cooperation (as noted by the relationship between African-American group size and the level of Latino representation and vice versa) in such districts.

As noted earlier, the dynamics of inter-minority relations are unlikely to be static. The considerable population growth in the Latino community over the past few years may be one of the factors underlying the inconsistency of these findings with previous research. As the alternative version of the power thesis presented earlier suggests, Latino immigration may alter the dynamics of coalitional relationships, reversing the assumption that Anglos and Latinos are more natural coalition partners than Anglos and African-Americans. In order to examine this possibility, I replicate the findings presented in Table 3.2, replacing the variable which takes account of the percentage of Latinos within a district with two variables which measure the percentage of the school district population that is comprised of Latino citizens and Latino non-citizens.[7] The positive relationship between Latino population size and African-American representation may be the result of either Latino support for African-American candidates, or the increased likelihood of Anglos to support African-American candidates in areas with large Latino populations (the former is the hypothesized relationship which lies at the heart of the rainbow coalition hypothesis). If the positive relationship between Latino group size and African-American representation is the result

[7] It should be noted that these variables correlate at .78, as Latino immigrants tend to settle in areas that are already heavily populated by Latino citizens.

of Latino attempts to form rainbow coalitions, then we would expect the relationship between Latino citizens and African-American representation to remain positive. For obvious reasons, a positive relationship between the percentage of Latino non-citizens within a district and African-American representation cannot be the result of electoral support for African-American candidates on the part of Latino non-citizens. Rather, such a relationship would be indicative of Anglo support for African-American candidates, possibly as a result of increased social distance between the Anglo and Latino communities.

The results presented in Table 3.3 indicate that there is no relationship between the size of the Latino citizen population and the level of African-American representation (p value=.868). However, in line with the alternative power thesis, the greater the percentage of Latino non-citizens within a district, the greater the level of African-American representation. The coefficient (.233) is also substantively meaningful and considerably larger than the coefficient for the relationship between the size of the Latino population and African-American representation presented in Table 3.2 (.053). As a side note, the under-representation of Latinos noted in Table 3.2 is lessened when controlling for citizenship.[8]

A considerably different portrait of inter-minority relations emerges in districts where one would expect to find rainbow coalitions (non Anglo-majority districts). In such districts, the size of the Latino citizen population does inflate the level of African-

[8] The coefficient for the relationship between the size of the Latino citizen population and Latino representation is .844, where a coefficient of 1 would indicate proportional representation.

American representation on local boards. Moreover, the presence of a Latino non-citizen population does not increase African-American representation as it does in other districts. Rather, the relationship here is negative, which is expected given that non-citizens cannot become members of an electoral coalition. Yet, there is no evidence that Latinos systematically benefit from such cooperative behavior in this analysis.

Table 3.3
Determinants of African-American and Latino School Board Representation in Non-Partisan Elections: The Role of Latino Citizenship
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates
Dependent Variable = Percentage of School Board Members That Are:

Independent Variable:	Black	SE	Latino	SE
African-American Population	.910**	(0.028)	-0.041	(0.028)
Latino Citizen Population	-0.006	(0.035)	.844**	(0.037)
Latino Non-Citizen Population	.233**	(0.077)	-0.118	(0.079)
% African-Americans who have Graduated from College	-0.017	(0.019)		
% Latinos who have Graduated from College			.108**	(0.025)
% Anglos Living in Poverty	.234**	(0.071)	.288**	(0.073)
Single-Member District System	-0.001	(0.006)	-0.003	(0.006)
Majority African-American Population	.097**	(0.022)	0.019	(0.022)
Majority Latino Population	-0.015	(0.018)	.115**	(0.019)
Combined Majority District	-.198*	(0.096)	-0.115	(0.098)
Combined Majority District X African-American Population	.565**	(0.181)	0.252	(0.185)

Table 3.3 (Continued)
Determinants of African-American and Latino School Board Representation in Non-Partisan Elections: The Role of Latino Citizenship
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates
Dependent Variable = Percentage of School Board Members That Are:

Independent Variable:	Black	SE	Latino	SE
Combined Majority District X Latino Citizen Population	.678**	(0.226)	0.103	(0.232)
Combined Majority District X Latino Non-Citizen Population	-.619**	(0.237)	0.014	(0.243)
Northeast	.015^	(0.008)	-.019*	(0.009)
Midwest	.019**	(0.007)	0.002	(0.007)
West	0.008	(0.007)	-.030**	(0.007)
Constant	-.024**	(0.009)	-.053**	(0.01)
N	1354		1354	
R2	0.695		0.698	

Breusch-Pagan test of independence: χ^2 (Probability), 8.351 (.004)
(standard errors in parentheses) ^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01

Finally, I noted earlier that previous work has emphasized the role of partisanship on race-based voting, arguing that partisan elections make it more difficult for individuals to make strictly race-based decisions. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 replicate the previous analysis for districts that elect their members through partisan elections. The Breusch-Pagan tests for both sets of equations indicate that correlated errors are not an issue, thus OLS is used in place of SUR. The models in Table 3.4 indicate that Latino representation is not affected by the presence of African-Americans within a district.

Table 3.4
Determinants of African-American and Latino School Board Representation in Partisan Elections
OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable = Percentage of School Board Members That Are:

Independent Variable:	Black	SE	Latino	SE
African-American Population	1.049**	(.063)	-.071	(.049)
Latino Population	.268**	(.082)	.878**	(.067)
% African-Americans who have Graduated from College	-.001	(.066)		
% Latinos who have Graduated from College			.115*	(.046)
% Anglos Living in Poverty	.323^	(.182)	.285*	(.145)
Single-Member District System	.003	(.014)	.017	(.011)
Majority African-American Population	-.062	(.049)	.037	(.039)
Majority Latino Population	-.182**	(.064)	-.020	(.051)
Northeast	.049**	(.017)	-.013	(.013)
Midwest	.057*	(.026)	.000	(.021)
West	-.013	(.032)	-.037	(.025)
Constant	-.076**	(.025)	-.060**	(.019)
N	221		222	
R^2	0.720		0.750	

(standard errors in parentheses) ^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01

Table 3.5
Determinants of African-American and Latino School Board Representation in Partisan Elections: The Role of Latino Citizenship
OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable = Percentage of School Board Members That Are:

Independent Variable:	Black	SE	Latino	SE
African-American Population	1.047**	(.063)	-.039	(.039)
Latino Citizen Population	.237*	(.096)	1.212**	(.062)
Latino Non-Citizen Population	.437	(.286)	-1.036**	(.183)
% African-Americans who have Graduated from College	.003	(.067)		
% Latinos who have Graduated from College			.073*	(.037)
% Anglos Living in Poverty	.345^	(.186)	.034	(.118)
Single-Member District System	.003	(.014)	.014	(.009)
Majority African-American Population	-.061	(.049)	.020	(.032)
Majority Latino Population	-.196**	(.068)	.141**	(.044)
Northeast	.051**	(.017)	-.028**	(.010)
Midwest	.057*	(.026)	.001	(.017)
West	-.018	(.033)	.019	(.021)
Constant	-.080**	(.025)	-.023	(.016)
N	221		222	
R^2	0.720		0.840	

(standard errors in parentheses) ^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01

However, there remains a positive relationship between the size of the Latino population and the level of African-American representation. Taking Latino citizenship into account does change this dynamic, but in a manner opposite to non-partisan systems. That is, there is a significant and positive relationship between the size of the Latino citizen population and the level of African-American representation, while the size of the Latino non-citizen population appears to have no effect in partisan systems. The effect of a one percentage point increase in the Latino citizen population benefits African-Americans only slightly less than a one point increase in the percentage of Anglos living in poverty. This finding would appear to provide some support for the hypothesis that cooperative electoral behavior between minorities is most likely to occur under partisan systems.

Attempts were made to examine how coalitional relationships varied in districts where rainbow coalitions made the most strategic sense, but only three districts in the sample employ partisan election systems and meet the "individually a minority, combined a majority" criteria used to identify such districts. Nonetheless, the analysis does indicate that inter-minority competition (that is, the formation of either Anglo-Latino or Anglo-black coalitions) does not appear to materialize in partisan systems as it does in non-partisan systems. This does not mean that rainbow coalitions routinely form in such circumstances. However, there is modest evidence for such coalitions in the analyses presented here. It seems that the presence of partisan elections limits competition and may occasionally produce cooperation.

Conclusion

The dynamics of inter-minority relations are unquestionably complicated. Despite commonly held beliefs about the ideological similarity between racial and ethnic minorities, the development of long-lasting rainbow coalitions is considered to be unlikely in most local settings. Like many previous works (i.e. McClain 1993; McClain and Karnig 1990; Meier and Stewart 1991b; Kaufmann 2003, 2004), the evidence presented here does not support the contention that rainbow coalitions routinely form in urban areas. However, the data point to different patterns of conflict than those suggested by earlier studies. Contrary to the predictions of Meier and Stewart's power thesis, there is little support for the notion that Anglo-Latino coalitions are an expected substitute for inter-minority ones. Rather, Latino immigration may encourage the development of Anglo-black coalitions, as seen by the increased likelihood of African-Americans to be elected to local boards in districts with a large Latino non-citizen population.

As with most studies which do not focus on individual attitudes or behavior, relationships between population size and representation are interpreted as being indicative of cooperation or conflict. Ultimately, such findings are best considered alongside other works that unveil the nuance of inter-minority relations by relying on individual-level data, focus groups, or in-depth case studies of select urban areas. Sidney (2002), for example, uses discourse analysis to argue that African-Americans and Latinos do not agree on the way in which issues related to race permeate the education

policymaking process. "If alliances do emerge," she warns, "they may be fragile ones (276)."

Despite such skepticism, this study does suggest one mechanism that can work to increase the likelihood that minorities will form cooperative electoral relationships, the adoption of a partisan electoral system. Non-partisan systems originally gained popularity during the progressive movement as a way to depoliticize the education policymaking process. Instead, non-partisan elections redistribute electoral advantages and incentives for coalition building away from some groups and towards others. Minority representation tends to be higher under partisan systems, with minorities, on average, being slightly *overrepresented* given their population size (although this is only true for Latinos if you discount the non-citizen population). Moreover, African-American representation on local boards also increases with the size of the Latino *citizen* population under partisan systems. Such benefits, however, remain confined to the relatively small number of districts (approximately 14%) that use such systems.

This study also indicates that African-Americans benefit from the presence of a large Latino population in districts where no individual racial/ethnic group comprises a majority of the population but the combined racial/ethnic minority population does. However, only 3% of all districts meet this demographic criterion, so that in the vast majority of school districts within the United States, competition, not cooperation, remains the norm. It is essential that future research pay attention to varying structural and demographic contexts in order to better understand what factors are responsible for the formation of different governing coalitions in urban areas across the United States.

CHAPTER IV

AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE SUBSTANTIVE REPRESENTATION OF LATINOS ON LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS

The present-day political life of racial/ethnic minorities within the United States is the product of a long history of overt and clandestine discrimination. This history, and the social attitudes which stem from it, not only complicates the political relationships between minorities and Anglos, but also between African-Americans and Latinos. As a result, inter-minority "cooperation" seems to be a relatively rare occurrence. The resulting norm of political "conflict" impacts multiple policy arenas, especially education. Anecdotal evidence, as we have seen, suggests that African-American – Latino relations are exceptionally tenuous within the educational policy arena (Vaca 2004). Moreover, several scholars have put forth the argument that education is a specific cause of tension between the communities in recent years (see de la Garza 1997). The previous chapter provides empirical support for the contention that minority groups seldom come together to form mass-level coalitions in school board elections.

Of course, studies which focus on mass-level data have limitations, especially for researchers concerned with public policy outcomes. Such studies are popular for a variety of reasons, including the advancement of academic theory but also the relatively easy access to data on this topic. As a result, we know much more about questions relating to African-American - Latino relations at the mass level than we do at the elite level. A brief survey of recent academic journal articles within political science will turn up multiple articles posing research questions analogous to "Do Black and Latino racial

attitudes and policy preferences differ when the members of the other groups live nearby," (Oliver and Wong 2003; Stein, Post, and Rinden 2000) "Do Black or Latino voters support or challenge legislation or initiatives hostile to the other group," (Morris 2000; Tolbert and Hero 1996) and "Do Latino and Black voters support candidates from the other group, and if so, under what circumstances?"

But what about elected public elites? Should we expect the evidence at the mass level to be consistent for elite behavior? There are several reasons to suspect that the political relationships between African-Americans and Latinos should be very different at the elite level. First, the high levels of education, experience, and financial resources required for winning political office may contribute to different responses to competition from other minority groups (Tedin and Murray 1994). Secondly, political elites operate under different constraints than non-elites. The nature of representation under different electoral rules substantially influences the behavior of elites, and indeed in ways that may differ from their true preferences. Finally, the size of the impact an individual elite and non-elite can have in their respective contexts should shape their preferences and behavior differently (the collective action problem differs for elites and non-elites).

For these reasons, this chapter moves beyond an examination of mass-level behavior. The focus here is no longer on what kind of electoral coalitions African-Americans and Latinos opt for, but what kind of relationships develop at the elite level, specifically among elected officials. Within the realm of education policy, this means elected school board members who oversee the operation of the vast majority of public schools within the United States. While a study of African-American and Latino

legislative cooperation on local school boards provides obvious leverage on questions concerning race relations within the education system, it may also afford a large degree of generalizability towards other elite groups. After all, as of 2000 nearly 21% of all African-American elected officials served of school boards (Joint Center 2000). Meanwhile, a plurality of Latino elected officials, 42%, held such positions (NALEO 2000). Thus, an examination of the relationships between African-Americans and Latinos serving on local school boards speaks not only to the primary political actors within the education policymaking process, but also to the behavior of a large number of minority politicians generally. This chapter begins by reviewing what we know about how minorities are substantively represented within legislative bodies, with an emphasis on substantive representation within local legislative bodies. Drawing on insights from studies focusing on inter-minority cooperation and conflict in local politics, I then consider what the implications of minority representation for other minority groups might be. The hypotheses which I draw out of this literature are tested using data provided from the National Latino Education Study.

Minority Representation in Local Government

Since Hanna Pitkin (1967) first developed the descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation framework, several scholars have studied the interrelationships between these various types of representation. One result has been a plethora of studies concluding that descriptive representation usually leads to substantive representation within legislative bodies (e.g. Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Meier and England 1984; Owens 2005; Karnig and Welch 1981).

While several of these studies focus on the U.S. Congress, others have established this link within local legislative bodies, such as city councils and school boards (see Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Marschall 2005; Meier and England 1984; Meier, Gonzalez-Juenke, Wrinkle, and Polinard 2005; Mladenka 1989b; Polinard, Wrinkle, Longoria, and Binder 1994; Robinson and Dye 1978; Robinson and England 1981).

Few studies, however, have extended this literature by examining the implication of minority representation for other minority groups. To some degree, this lack of scholarly attention can be explained by the dominant way substantive representation has been conceptualized. When viewed primarily as policy congruence between representatives and their constituencies, the liberal ideological disposition and Democratic Party affiliation of most African-Americans and Latinos tends to result in similar voting patterns, especially within U.S. Congress (Lublin 1997). Yet, students of representation have long thought of representation in numerous ways beyond policy congruence. Eulau and Karps (1977), for example, add three alternative conceptualizations: service responsiveness, allocative responsiveness, and symbolism.[9]

Scholars, unfortunately, have paid little consideration to how to best think of substantive representation at different levels of government. Lower levels of government are more likely to face issues which could be considered pragmatic and may

[9] Eulau and Karps (1977, 241) define these alternative conceptualizations in the following manner: "There is service responsiveness which involves the efforts of the representative to secure particularized benefits for individuals or groups in his constituency. There is allocation responsiveness which refers to the representative's efforts to obtain benefits for his constituency through pork-barrel exchanges in the appropriations process or through administrative inventions. Finally, there is what we shall call symbolic responsiveness which involves public gestures of a sort that create a sense of trust and support in the relationship between representative and represented.

not easily be placed on an ideological dimension (Straayer, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1998). This is compounded within the education system, where nonpartisan governance makes it more difficult for school board members to form voting blocs which are rooted in ideology. In such settings, a complete understanding of substantive representation must consider not only voting patterns, as most studies of representation in U.S. Congress or state legislatures do, but alternative conceptualizations of substantive representation, such as those presented by Eulau and Karps (1977).

Alternative conceptualizations also carry with them different implications relating to African-American and Latino cooperation and conflict. Whereas both African-Americans and Latinos typically stand to benefit from redistributive policies, service responsiveness is more likely to occur within a strict zero-sum context, with particularized benefits for African-Americans limiting the benefits which Latinos are able to receive and vice versa. Not surprisingly, such scarcity has been found to foster inter-minority competition over beneficial resources.

Studies which have found that socioeconomic indicators across racial/ethnic groups positively covary argue that this occurs because income and education, while not limitless, do not occur within a zero-sum context (see McClain and Tauber 2001, Meier et al. 2004). Political empowerment variables, such as representation on city councils, are more likely to negatively covary because they do exist within a zero-sum context, where increased representation on the part of one group makes it more difficult for other groups to achieve representation.

Within the field of urban politics, one popular measure of the substantive representation of racial/ethnic minorities has been the percentage of municipal employees belonging to such groups. A long stream of literature concludes that as minority political power increases so does the share of public jobs held by minorities (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Campbell and Feagin 1975; Chandler and Gely 1995; Dye and Renick 1981; Eisinger 1982a, 1982b; Kerr and Mladenka 1994; Mladenka 1989a, 1989b; Polinard et al. 1994; Saltzstein 1989; Stein 1986). Generally, these studies find that while minority population size is the primary determinant of public employment, politics does play a critical role. This occurs mainly through minority representation on city council seats, with control of the mayoral office being a less consistent predictor of employment (see Kerr and Mladenka 1994; Mladenka 1989a). Similar relationships also occur within school districts, where minority representation on school boards consistently has been found to be related to more minority administrators and teachers (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991b; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998). Saltzstein (1986) has even extended this hypothesis to search for evidence of substantive representation among females, finding that female political empowerment is positively related to female employment in non-clerical and administrative positions. Together, these studies suggest that municipal employment is an extremely useful area of investigation for representation scholars.

Using the Eulau and Karps (1977, 241) framework, public employee hires can be understood as form of service responsiveness, in that such hires illustrate “efforts by

representatives to secure particularized benefits for individuals or groups in his constituency." That is, the urban politics literature argues that minority politicians seek to promote the increased hiring of minority workers specifically because minority employment is seen as a way to promote the economic advancement of minority groups. In the words of Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984, 169), "governmental employment has long been an important goal and point of early access for excluded groups in American society, most recently for blacks and Hispanics."

Additionally, such hires can be considered symbolic in nature, fitting Eulau and Karps' definition of "public gestures of a sort that create a sense of trust and support." This is especially true for certain employment sectors, such as police departments. Lastly, it may be accurate to view public employee hires as a proxy for policy responsiveness, bearing in mind that descriptive representation within public organizations has been shown to positively influence policy outcomes for minority groups through variety of direct and indirect means (Hindera 1993a, 1993b; Meier, Stewart, and England, 1989; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1989; Meier 1993; Selden 1997; Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998).

In a previous study, McClain (1993) considers the relationship between African-American and Latino municipal employment. Although employment in such positions is, to some degree, a zero-sum situation, McClain (1993) finds no relationship between African-American and Latino employment. As with political offices, when both groups make gains, they tend to do so at the expense of Anglos. McClain's study, however, does not consider how minority political representation affects the municipal employment of

other minority groups, so no conclusions can be drawn regarding African-American and Latino legislative cooperation at the local level.

This chapter takes up this question. More succinctly, *are the positive affects of African-American representation strengthened, weakened, or unaffected by the presence of Latino representation?* Conversely, *are the positive affects of Latino representation strengthened, weakened, or unaffected by the presence of African-American representation?* Examining these questions also makes an important advancement beyond the simple covariance models used in other works and allows for more definitive statements regarding causality. They also allow for an examination of minority-minority relations within the local legislative process, rather than in terms of political inputs or outputs.

Modeling African-American and Latino Access to Administrative and Teaching Positions

Once again, the National Latino Education Study offers unique leverage on this question. The NLES falls just shy on capturing the universe of urban school districts within the United States, and therefore also offers a nearly complete sample of multiracial school districts as well. The general hypotheses outlined above require that school districts not only be diverse in terms of the composition of their population, but also in terms of their school board membership. In other words, the hypotheses argue that the ability of racial/ethnic minorities to translate descriptive representation on school boards into some form of substantive representation may be contingent upon the presence of other minorities on the board.

Descriptive representation is measured in a relatively straightforward manner, by taking account of the percentage of school board seats held by each group. Considering the contingent nature of the hypotheses, this measure is interacted with a simply dummy variable, coded "1" if both African-Americans and Latinos serve on the school board, "0" otherwise. Within the NLES there are 113 districts which meet this criterion.

Measuring substantive representation, of course, presents a much greater challenge. As mentioned above, one popular measure within the urban politics literature has been the percentage of municipal employees belonging to some group. Within the educational system, the analogous measure is the percentage of administrators. As with municipal employees, operationalizing the substantive representation of racial/ethnic minorities as the percentage of minority administrators and teachers fits several facets of Eulau and Karps' (1977) framework, including service responsiveness and symbolism. Within education there is a long stream of literature arguing that increased descriptive representation among administrators and teachers will positively affect student outcomes, defined both in terms of academic performance and lower levels of "second-generation discrimination" (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991b; Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998).[10] Thus, the argument that such a measure may also be seen as a form of policy responsiveness is applicable within education. Lastly, there is also a large degree of substantive importance attached to minority employment within the public education system. Just as Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984, 169) emphasize the importance of

[10] This is an area which will be examined more in-depth in Chapter V.

minority municipal employment as a "point of early access for excluded groups in American society," so too has employment within public schools been instrumental in establishing a middle class within minority communities.

Beyond political explanations of minority employment, the most influential variables determining the percentage of minority administrators should be the size of the available labor pool. This is accounted for by controlling for the percentage of population comprised of African-Americans/Latinos. Employment within the educational system also requires a college degree, so I control for the percentage of African-Americans/Latinos who possess at least a bachelor's degree. The same variables should determine the percentage of African-American/Latino teachers within a district; however, representation among teaching faculties may also be a function of the presence of co-ethnics within the administrators. With this in mind, I account for the percentage of African-American/Latino administrators when predicting the percentage of African-American/Latino teachers within a district. As a final control, I insert a dummy variable for those districts in which African-Americans or Latinos control a majority of seats on the board.

Findings

Table 4.1 presents the results for the first series of models, which attempt to determine what influences the percentage of African-American and Latino administrators within a district. The findings indicate that for each point increase in the percentage of the African-American population, African-American representation among school administrators increases .759. In line with the expectation that

Table 4.1

Cooperation and Conflict in the Hiring of Minority Administrators

OLS Estimates

Dependent Variable = Percentage of School Administrators That Are:

Independent Variable:	Black	SE	Latino	SE
Black Population	.759**	(0.042)		
Latino Population			.333**	(0.023)
% Blacks who have a College Degree	.018*	(0.009)		
% Latinos who have a College Degree			.045**	(0.009)
% Black School Board Members	.172**	(0.036)		
% Latino School Board Members			.345**	(0.053)
Blacks and Latinos on the Board (0,1)	1.100	(1.720)	0.669	(1.999)
% Black School Board Members "X" Blacks and Latinos on the Board	-0.018	(0.083)		
% Latino School Board Members "X" Blacks and Latinos on the Board			-.205*	(0.101)
Majority Black Board	7.087*	(3.063)		
Majority Latino Board			6.572	(4.243)
Constant	-0.019	(0.309)	-1.708**	(0.276)
N	1361		1372	
R^2	0.79		0.83	

^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01

employment is a function of the available labor pool, there is also a boost as the percentage African-Americans holding a college degree increases.

African-American employment is also increased by political representation, where capturing an additional seat on a seven member board appears to increase the percentage of African-American administrators by 2.4 percent. There appears to be no evidence, however, that the ability of African-Americans to translate descriptive representation on school boards into substantive representation is in any way affected by the presence of Latinos on the board.

For Latinos, population numbers appear to matter less. The percentage of school administrators who are Latino increases by .333 with each additional point increase in the percentage of the Latino population (where the analogous coefficient for African-Americans is .759). However, Latinos do profit from a higher level of college education, indicating that market forces are important for both communities. The finding that Latino administrative employment increases at a higher rate with college education than it does for African-Americans (coefficient of .045 for Latinos, compared to .018 for African-Americans) is a possible indicator that Latino access to government employment is more influenced by the characteristics of that community.

Latinos appear to benefit just as much from political office holding as they do from their population size, a sharp contrast from African-Americans where population numbers seem have a much larger influence on employment than office holding. Also conflicting with the model for African-Americans, we do find that the positive relationship between Latino representation on school boards and Latino representation

among school administrators *is* contingent upon the presence of African-Americans on the board.

The findings here point towards inter-minority competition within the legislative arena of the educational policymaking process, with the positive effect of Latino representation being diminished on boards where African-Americans are likewise represented. This effect is also substantively meaningful. In order to illustrate this, Figure 4.1 plots the slope for the relationship between Latino board membership and the percentage of Latino administrators for both possible conditions (serving with or without African-Americans), holding all other variables at their mean or modal categories.

Figure 4.1
The Effect of Black Political Representation on the Relationship between Latino Board Members and Latino Administrators



Let us consider a hypothetical seven member board on which Latinos hold two seats (or approximately 28% of the seats). If Latinos do not have to compete with African-American representatives, they can expect to get a boost just shy of 10 percentage points (9.7) in their share of administrative positions. On boards in which there are African-American representatives to compete with, Latinos can expect a much more modest boost of 4.6 percentage points, even when controlling for the main effect which indicates that the percentage of Latino administrators tends to be slightly higher within districts in which both groups serve on the board.

Table 4.2 presents the results for a second series of models in order to determine whether school board representation has an effect on the hiring on minority teachers, as it does on minority administrators. Unlike the models presented in Table 4.1, the Breusch-Pagan test (χ^2= 4.782, p= .029) reveals that the models for African-Americans and Latinos suffer from correlation among the residuals, necessitating the use of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions.

As with administrators, African-American representation among teachers increases with the size of the African-American population; although, unlike the models for administrators, the level of education within the African-American community does not have an effect. African-American employment among teachers is also increased by political representation. However, the greatest impact on descriptive representation among teachers appears to be the presence of African-American administrators, with a one percentage point increase in the number of African-American administrators associated with just under a .5 percentage point increase in the number of African-

Table 4.2
Cooperation and Conflict in the Hiring of Minority Teachers
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimates
Dependent Variable = Percentage of School Teacher That Are:

Independent Variable:	Black	SE	Latino	SE
Black Population	0.276**	(0.019)		
Latino Population			0.190**	(0.012)
% Blacks who have a College Degree	-0.005	(0.008)		
% Latinos who have a College Degree			0.024*	(0.010)
% Black School Administrators	0.498**	(0.016)		
% Latino School Administrators			0.515**	(0.020)
% Black School Board Members	0.057**	(0.014)		
% Latino School Board Members			0.103**	(0.018)
Blacks and Latinos on the Board (0,1)	-1.079	(0.814)	0.754	(0.788)
% Black School Board Members "X" Blacks and Latinos on the Board	0.032	(0.029)		
% Latino School Board Members "X" Blacks and Latinos on the Board			-0.133**	(0.028)
Majority Black Board	7.455**	(0.991)		
Majority Latino Board			0.140	(1.165)
Constant	-0.563**	(0.216)	-0.723	(0.229)
N	1353		1353	
R^2	0.87		0.88	

Breusch-Pagan test of independence: χ^2 (Probability), 4.782 (.029) ^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01

American teachers. As with Table 4.1, there is no evidence that the ability of African-Americans to translate political representation into increased employment within the educational system is affected by the presence of Latinos on the board.

Latino representation among teachers likewise increases with the size of the Latino population, although, like the models for minority administrators, Latinos appear to be benefit from population size to a smaller degree than African-Americans. Latino education, measured as the percentage of Latinos holding a college degree, is also a significant predictor of Latino teachers. Once again, the presence of co-ethnics in administrative positions has a greatest substantive impact. The size of the benefit which Latinos extract from passive representation among administrators is analogous to that which African-Americans extract (coefficients =.515 and .498 respectively). Additionally, Latinos receive a direct benefit from having co-ethnics on the school board, but, as with administrators, the findings also point towards inter-minority competition within the legislative arena of the educational policymaking process

The positive influence of Latino school board members is drastically reduced in districts where African-Americans serve on the board (coefficient for the interactive term= -.133, compared to .103 for the main effect). Thus, when it comes to the hiring of both administrators and teachers, we see that Latinos are far less able to translate political gains into employment in districts where they serve on boards alongside African-Americans.

While these findings contribute to the existing literature on minority representation by establishing a pattern of inter-minority competition, a larger question

remains: Why do minorities compete on local school boards? More specifically, why do these results seem to indicate that the ability of Latinos to turn descriptive representation into substantive representation is hampered on multi-minority school boards while African-Americans appear to be unaffected on such boards? In the next section, I turn my attention to one possible explanation suggested, although never empirically tested, by other scholars: *Latino population growth.*

Latino Population Growth as an Explanation of Inter-Minority Competition within the Local Legislative Arena

As mentioned in the first chapter, Rudy de la Garza (1997) cites education as one of the four prime causes of tension between African-Americans and Latinos over the past several years. In particular, de la Garza (1997) points towards Latino population growth and the resulting pressure on school districts to hire more Latino administrators. Such positions exist within a "soft" zero-sum context in that districts do have the ability to create additional slots, however the limited resources available to districts often seriously constrains their ability to do so. If districts are unable to respond to Latino population growth by creating additional administrative positions then increasing Latinos' share of administrative positions will mean lowering the share for other groups, including African-Americans. The argument presented here is simple; Latinos will find themselves less able to translate their descriptive representation on school boards into substantive representation (conceived of as the hiring of Latino school administrators) in districts which are characterized by higher rates of Latino population growth.

There are a variety of reasons, beyond the zero-sum context, which might lead scholars to suspect that such a relationship exists. Perhaps the most obvious of these is a derivation of the "racial threat" hypothesis. In its simplest form, the racial threat hypothesis argues that the racial attitudes of Anglos tend to be more hostile in communities with large minority populations (Blalock 1967; Giles 1977). In this vein, several studies have established that there is a negative relationship between minority group size and the racial attitudes of Anglos (Giles 1977; Giles and Bunker 1993; Glaser 1994; Tolbert and Grummel 2003). In a more recent study, Cain, Citrin, and Wong (2000) expand the hypothesis beyond Anglo attitudes, finding that Latinos tend to respond to large African-American populations by developing stronger racial/ethnic identities. Such findings should not be unexpected considering other work notes the relatively high degree of economic competition between Latinos and African-Americans (Waldinger 2001). Economic competition, then, may explain why feelings of threat are generalizable beyond Anglos, as large Latino populations may limit African-American opportunities within an area and vice versa.

However, minority group size is only one mechanism by which threat can occur. Unlike African-Americans, whose population numbers have stayed relatively constant over the past several decades, the Latino community has been characterized by extremely high rates of growth within recent years. Indeed, the average school district within the United States witnessed a growth of 3.7 percentage points between 1990 and 2000. One argument which may be posed is that an increase in the size of the minority population, not simply their preexistent numbers, works to cause feelings of threat. In

other words, a group which increases in size from 10% to 20% is more likely to produce feelings of threat in others than a group whose population has remained constant at 21%. This line of reasoning assumes that groups are most likely to feel that their social and economic privilege is threatened not when confronted with other groups who possesss ubstantial (numerical) resources, but rather when confronted with other groups who enjoy increasingly greater resources.[11]

This logic can also be extended beyond racial attitudes. Giles and Hertz (1994) argues that threat affects other forms of political behavior, specifically partisan identification. Oliver (2001) even notes that individuals residing in communities with greater levels of racial/ethnic heterogeneity are more likely to contact officials and attend community board meetings (however, see Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) who find that minority group size has a depressive effect on Anglo political participation). Lastly, Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran (1996) find that members of Congress are *less* likely to substantively represent African-Americans when the African-American population shifts from 15 to 25%. At smaller numbers, representatives are able to substantively represent African-American constituents without worry of electoral reprisal on the part of non-blacks. At higher levels, however, the representative's fear of alienating non-blacks works to discourage the substantive representation of African-Americans.

[11] Similar arguments can be found in comparative politics, where scholars such as Lijphart (1977) and Dahl (1971) have long noted that increases in the number of ethnic groups often tests the stability of democratic governments. As Dahl (1971, 108) writes, "that subcultural pluralism often places a dangerous strain on the tolerance and mutual security required for a system of public contestation seems hardly open to doubt."

If this literature is correct, then presumably the growth within the Latino population should likewise have consequences beyond the formation of racial attitudes. The question presented here, then, is whether Latino population growth has affected not only racial attitudes but the nature of Latino representation within local legislative bodies. In narrower terms, I am attempting to discern whether Latinos are less able to translate their descriptive representation on local school boards into substantive representation in districts which have been characterized by higher rates of Latino population growth.

In order to test this hypothesis, I replicate the model presented in Table 4.1. However, rather than interacting the measure of Latino descriptive representation with a dummy variable indicating whether or not African-Americans serve on the board as well, I interact it with a measure of Latino population growth. This measure is calculated by subtracting the Latino population in 1990 from the Latino population in 2000 for each school district included in the NLES. Correspondingly, I also control for whether Latino population growth has a direct effect on the percentage of Latino administrators.

Before turning to the results, one should note that districts in which African-Americans and Latinos serve on the school board simultaneously are also characterized by extremely high rates of Latino population growth, see Table 4.3. As mentioned earlier, the average district saw the Latino population rise by 3.7 percentage points between 1990 and 2000, with the average Latino population being 13% by 2000. Within the 113 school districts in which African-Americans and Latinos both serve on the

board, Latino population growth was 7.8 percentage points. This compares to a rate of growth of 3.4 percentage points in all other districts. This difference is statistically significant. Thus, not only do we have potentially rivaling explanations of Latino administrative employment, but explanations which suffer from a considerable degree of empirical overlap.

Table 4.3
Mean Latino Population Growth (as a Percent of the Total Population)

Districts with both Latinos and Blacks on the School Board	7.8
All Other Districts	3.4
Difference of Means Test, t score = -9.999	
All Districts	3.7

Table 4.4 presents the results for the model which accounts for Latino population growth. The R^2 for this model (.854) is modestly higher than the R^2 for the model presented in Table 4.1 (.825), indicating that controlling for Latino population growth explains more of the variance in Latino administrative appointments than controlling for multi-minority school boards. Including Latino population growth increases the degree to which Latinos appear to be able to translate their population numbers into administrative positions, with Latinos getting a .498 percentage point boost in their

administrative positions with each additional percentage point increase in the population (compared to the .333 point boost suggested in the Table 4.1).

Table 4.4
Latino Population Growth and the Substantive Representation of Latinos on Local School Boards
OLS Estimates

Dependent Variable= % Latino Administrators

Independent Variables:	
Latino Population	.498** (0.04)
Latino Education	.036** (0.007)
% Latino Board Members	.311** (0.055)
Latino Population Growth	-.463** (0.093)
% Latino Board Members "X" Latino Population Growth	-.016** (0.004)
Majority Latino Board	4.401 (3.231)
Constant	-1.341** (0.222)
N	1372
F	196.79
R^2	0.85

(robust standard errors in parentheses)
^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01

When Latino population growth is held at 0, we see that Latinos can expect to see a .311 point gain in their share of administrative for each percentage point increase in their level of school board representation. However, Latino population growth has a negative interactive effect with Latino school board representation. This, combined with the finding that Latino population growth has a negative and significant direct effect as well, raises serious concerns about the extent to which Latinos are able to gain access to administrative positions in communities which are characterized by high rates of Latino population growth.

Figure 4.2 illustrates how the positive effect of Latino board membership on the percentage of Latino administrators differs at alternative rates of Latino population growth. Once again, a substantive example may allow for a clearer interpretation of these results. Accordingly, let us examine how Latinos would be able to translate their descriptive representation on a school board into increased administrative appointments in three hypothetical districts, each of which have a seven-member board with Latinos holding two seats (or approximately 28%). In the first hypothetical district the size of the Latino population remained unchanged between 1990 and 2000. Within that district, Latinos should expect to see their political representation net them 8.7 percentage points more Latino administrators than they would have in a district in which they were excluded from the school board. The second district saw the Latino population grow by 3.7 percentage points (which is the mean rate of growth for all districts included in this sample). There, Latinos are able to translate their political clout into an increase in more

administrative positions of 5.3 percentage points, a substantial decrease from the 8.7 points they would expect when the size of the Latino population remained constant.

As I mentioned earlier, districts in which Latinos and African-Americans serve on the school board simultaneously have enjoyed much higher rates of Latino population growth than the average district. To be more specific, multi-minority board districts have seen the Latino population grow by 7.8 percentage points (compared to an overall

Figure 4.2
The Effect of Latino Population Growth on the Relationship between Latino Board Members and Latino Administrators



mean of 3.7). Table 4.1 suggests that Latinos are less able to convert school board seats into administrative positions in multi-minority board districts. If we only consider how Latino population growth affects this relationship in such districts we come to a similar conclusion. Holding Latino population growth at 7.8 percentage points, Latinos can expect to see a boost of 1.6 point in their administrative appointments when they comprise 28% of the school board compared to what they would expect if they held no seats. Not only is this figure considerably lower than the 8.7 point boost we expect to see in districts with no Latino population growth, but it is also remarkably lower than the 4.6 point boost predicted for these same districts by the model in Table 4.1. Thus, although they differ about the degree to which Latinos will be hampered in their ability to convert their descriptive representation into substantive representation, the models presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.4 both predict that Latinos will find themselves worse off in multi-minority board districts.

Table 4.5 presents a single model which accounts for both explanations in order to determine which force, Latino population growth or multi-minority school boards, is responsible for the diminished ability of Latinos to gain access to administrative positions. The results show that variables measuring Latino population growth and its interactive effect with Latino school board representation continue to have a negative influence on the substantive representation of Latinos. The substantive effect of Latino population growth also changes little in this model. However, the interaction between Latino board representation and the simple dummy variable which accounts for whether or not Latinos and African-Americans serve on the board simultaneously is no longer

Table 4.5
The Substantive Representation of Latinos on Local School Boards: Testing Competing Explanations
OLS Estimates

Dependent Variable= % Latino Administrators

Independent Variables:	
Latino Population	.493**
	(.040)
Latino Education	.033**
	(.007)
% Latino Board Members	.339**
	(.060)
Latinos and Blacks on the Board	-.085
	(1.718)
% Latino Board Members "X"	-.105
Latinos and Blacks on the Board	(.084)
Latino Population Growth	-.454**
	(.092)
% Latino Board Members "X"	-.014**
Latino Population Growth	(.004)
Majority Latino Board	2.824
	(3.608)
Constant	-1.247**
	(.214)
N	1372
F	158.9
R^2	.86

(robust standard errors in parentheses)
^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01

significant, although the direction remains negative. Taken together with the observation made earlier that the Latino population growth model (Table 4.4) explains more of the variance in Latino administrative appointments than the multi-minority board model presented in Table 4.1 (.854 compared to .825), we have evidence that Latino population growth is a more robust predictor.

Lastly, I consider the possibility that there is a three-way interactive effect between Latino school board representation, Latino population growth, and multi-minority boards. The results presented in Table 4.6 find no evidence for this hypothesis. This is not surprising, given that this model suffers from severe multicollinarity (mean VIF= 75.53).

Conclusion

This chapter sought to determine whether African-American – Latino relations are characterized by cooperation or conflict within the legislative stage of the education policymaking process. Within education, this is done by examining whether African-Americans and Latinos are better or less able to substantively represent their group's interest on school boards on which both groups serve. Drawing on work from the urban politics literature, substantive representation is conceptualized as the relationship between descriptive representation on the school board and descriptive representation among school administrators. The findings offer no evidence that the substantive representation of African-Americans is effected by the presence of Latinos on the board. However, Latino political representation has less of a positive impact on the percentage of Latino administrators when they serve on boards alongside African-Americans.

Table 4.6
An Interactive Model of the Substantive Representation of Latinos on Local School Boards
OLS Estimates

Dependent Variable= % Latino Administrators

Independent Variables:	
Latino Population	.492**
	(.041)
Latino Education	.033**
	(.007)
% Latino Board Members	.342**
	(.062)
Latinos and Blacks on the Board	.013
	(1.666)
% Latino Board Members "X"	-.138
Latinos and Blacks on the Board	(.090)
Latino Population Growth	-.455**
	(.092)
% Latino Board Members "X"	-.014**
Latino Population Growth	(.004)
% Latino Board Members "X"	.003
Latino Population Growth "X"	(.009)
Latinos and Blacks on the Board	
Majority Latino Board	-2.709
	(3.601)
Constant	-1.247**
	(.214)
N	1372
F	154.53
R^2	.86

(robust standard errors in parentheses)
^p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01

An alternative hypothesis suggests that Latinos will be hurt in terms of substantive representation in areas where the rate of Latino population growth is high. The empirical results confirm this hypothesis. Given current demographic trends, population growth will continue to have a significant impact on the representation of Latino community for years to come. While the size of the African-American population has remained relatively constant in recent years, the Latino community enjoys extremely high rates of growth both in the Southwest and in areas which have not had traditionally large Latino populations.

When both explanations are pitted against each other, Latino population growth retains significance while the hypothesis pertaining to multi-minority school boards does not. The findings in this chapter underscore an often ignored point in the study of racial and ethnic politics: *Competing explanations of the same phenomenon are often empirically, if not theoretically, related to one another. Therefore, studies which do not consider multiple explanations within the same model cannot make definitive statements about causality and run a serious risk of reporting spurious results*.

Within this chapter, we note that the diminished ability of Latinos to translate their descriptive representation into substantive representation in districts where both Latinos and African-Americans serve on the board is likely a function of the high rates of Latino population growth which also characterizes such districts. While not as blatant an example of potential spuriousness, the previous chapter demonstrates that scholars who fail to consider the role of partisanship in the formation of interracial coalitions in local school board elections are likely to come up with markedly different results than

those who do. Thus, the larger point may be that works in this field continue suffer from omitted variable basis. While this work is undoubtedly not exempt from this criticism, largely because of the limited theoretical development on this topic, scholars must continue to recognize such limitations and attempt to compensate for them in whatever manner they can.

CHAPTER V

AFRICAN-AMERICANS, LATINOS, AND SECOND-GENERATION DISCRIMINATION

In recent years, significant scholarly attention has been paid to the determinants of minority representation among elected school boards, administrators, and teaching facilities. Mere descriptive representation, however, has not been viewed as an end-in-itself. Rather, it is valued because such representation, through a variety of casual mechanisms, can serve to better the education of minority children. Despite such an understanding, the exact way in which African-Americans – Latino relations actually affect educational outputs, and the way in which African-Americans – Latino relations affect policy implementation and outcomes more generally, is relatively understudied compared to other areas, such as public opinion and electoral competition. In this chapter we turn to the issue of minority student performance and examine how the African-American - Latino relations affect the education that minority children receive in multiracial school districts. Three basic theories are used in order to determine the conditions under which minority children will face discrimination and receive inferior education. The first are theories of racial context, specifically those developed by Rodney Hero (1998; Hero and Tolbert 1996). Second, I turn to broader theories of race relations and the intersectionality of race and socioeconomic status. Such theories are typically meant to apply to Anglo-black or Anglo-Latino relations, but carry clear implications for relations in tri-racial settings as well. Lastly, I turn to the theory of representative bureaucracy, derived largely form work by Ken Meier and his co-authors

(Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991b; Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999), in order to explain how the demographic composition of a school's faculty can change the nature of education for minority students.

In their influential work, Baumgartner and Jones (1993) argue that politics and policy-making are dominated by laws of negative feedback. Most policy arenas, they argue, are characterized by stability, exhibiting only modest change over time. Yet, at times policy subsystems are hit with shocks, or "punctuations," which disturb the status-quo and create a new equilibrium. Within the context of the education policy, one would be hard-pressed to find a better example of such a punctuation than the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas*. Even in this example, however, the force of negative feedback is evident. While *Brown* was poised to redefine the nature of minority education within the United States, the system looks only marginally different in 2006 than it did fifty years earlier.

The positive effect of the *Brown* decision on the success of minority students was softened by several other trends within the public schools. While segregation within school districts has decreased in the fifty years since *Brown*, there has been a well documented increase in the level of segregation *between* school districts (Clotfelter 2004). Even when minority children attend schools which are racially integrated, segregation may again emerge in the form of academic grouping, a phenomenon also referred to as "second-generation discrimination."

In essence, second-generation discrimination refers to the use academic grouping and discipline in a discriminatory manner so that students from one racial/ethnic group

are separated from another (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991b; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998). Such practices have largely been viewed as a response to the school integration movement of the late 1960s (Harry and Anderson 1994; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998). Facing the racial integration of schools within districts, academic grouping provides a way for racial groups to be kept separate while remaining in fully "integrated" schools. Such practices have lead to legal challenges, including the 1979 case *Larry P. et al. v. Wilson Riles et al.*, in which a San Francisco school district was accused of discriminating against five African-American students who had been placed in special education classes. In that district, African-Americans comprised 29% of the student population, yet comprised 66% of students enrolled in educable mentally retarded classes. While the plaintiffs in *Larry P*. and other similar cases filed in the 1970s were successful, the use of academic grouping has continued. Harry and Anderson (1994, 603) write, "since those early years, the phenomenon of overrepresentation of African-Americans in special education, and their corresponding under-representation in programs for the gifted and talented, has continued unabated." This observation has been confirmed and extended to other racial/ethnic minorities by multiple studies within education, sociology, and political science (Bullock and Stewart 1978a, 1978b; England and Meier 1985; Epstein 1986; Eyler, Cook, and Ward 1983; Fierros and Conroy 2002; Finn 1982; Ford and Webb 1994; Gregory 1995; Jones and Menchetti 2001; Mehan, Villanueva, Hubbard, and Lintz 1996; Meier 1984; Meier and England 1984; Meier, Steward, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991b; Oswald, Coutinho, and Best 2002; Shaw and Braden 1990; Stewart

and Bullock 1981; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998; but see Wainscott and Woodard 1988).

Regardless of whether segregation occurs within districts, between districts, or within schools, the result is the same. As Gartner and Lipsky (1987, 368) note, "the assumptions underlying separate programs have produced a system that is both segregated and second class." Once enrolled in remedial classes, studies have shown that student performance begins to drop steadily below what one would predict given past achievement and a student's demographic background (Braddock and Dawkins 1993; Lee and Bryk 1998; Mehan, Villanuea, Hubbard, and Lintz 1996; Oakes 1985). Likewise, the application of discipline measures, either in the form of corporal punishment, suspension, or expulsion without total cessation of educational services, has been found to lower achievement and encourage dropouts (Ekstrom, Goertz, Pollack, and Rock 1986; Skiba and Peterson 1999).

Racial Context

One contributor to second generation discrimination may be social diversity. Within the field of political behavior, scholars have long hypothesized that greater minority group size results in increasingly prejudicial attitudes on the part of non-minorities (Giles 1977; Giles and Bunker 1993; Glaser 1994; Tolbert and Grummel 2003). In its simplest form, the hypothesis suggests that "a superordinate group (e.g., whites) becomes more racially hostile as the size of the proximate subordinate group increases, which punitively threatens the former's economic and social privilege" (Oliver and Wong 2003). The notion that prejudicial attitudes are more likely to form in

diverse environments, however, stands in contrast to other works which finds that social contact, which is presumably higher in diverse environments, reduces prejudice (Aberbach and Walker 1973; Ellison and Powers 1994; Meer and Feedman 1966; Schuman and Hatchett 1974; Sigelman and Welch 1993; Voss and Miller 2001; Williams 1964; Welch and Sigelman 2000). Social contact, these studies argue, makes it difficult for groups to accept typically negative stereotypes and also increases the probability of both groups holding shared values.

Early work by St. John and Lewis (1971) argues that student achievement for both African-Americans and Anglos is lower in diverse schools. In a more contempory study, however, Oswald, Coutinho, and Best (2002) find that the classification of African-American students as mentally retarded tends to decrease as the size of the non-white population grows, implying that diversity tends to reduce discrimination against African-Americans and other racial/ethnic minorities.

Additional insights on education equity may be gained from Hero's (1998; Hero and Tolbert 1996) work on the influence of racial/ethnic diversity on public policy. While Hero's policy indicators are taken at the state-level, those that pertain to education (e.g. minority suspension and graduation ratios) are more appropriately measured at other units of analysis, such as school districts. Hero (1998; Tolbert and Hero 2001) has demonstrated that his state-level theory of social diversity can be applied at to sub-state units, further suggesting that racial context may influence the level of educational equity, including second-generation discrimination, within school districts. In the end, Hero (1998, 88) concludes that "the little racial/ethnic diversity that exists in homogenous

environments is associated with relatively worse [education] policy outcomes for minorities." He argues that this occurs because homogeneous environments are characterized by "consensual pluralism," and political disputes are unlikely revolve around issues of racial/ethnic equity. In the end, both Oswald et al. (2002) and Hero (1998; Hero and Tolbert 1996) argue that, contrary to the predictions of the threat hypothesis, diversity is likely to be positively related to educational equity. Inequity, then, will be most likely to occur in homogenous districts, where issues are rarely framed in racial/ethnic terms and minorities lack the numbers to shape the political process. This leads to the following hypothesis regarding the influence of racial context on second generation discrimination:

Racial/Ethnic diversity will be negatively related to second-generation discrimination.

Racial/Ethnic Social Status

While theories of racial context revolve largely around levels of diversity or minority group size, threat to a "superordinate group's economic and social privilege" can come about through a variety of other means. In order to fully understand race relations, one must also consider the relative socioeconomic position of groups relative to one another. High-SES minority groups may enjoy more stable leadership and find themselves increasingly in competition with Anglos for similar jobs and positions of political influence. Contrary to this expectation, however, the Feagin (1980)/Giles and Evans (1985) argument states that the better situated minority groups are, relative to Anglos, the less that minority groups will be targeted for discrimination. One of the reasons this for this relationship is that equal social status results in an increased

probability of minorities holding shared values with Anglos. There is an alternative, perhaps simpler, explanation as to why increased minority socioeconomic status might result in lower levels of discrimination: discrimination is easier to perpetrate against individuals with few socioeconomic resources. Thus, while the presence of such resources may increase feelings of threat among superordinate groups (typically Anglos), it also serves to limit the extent to which hostile attitudes can be translated into discriminatory behavior, as minority groups will be more apt to challenge discriminatory behavior through political or legal means.

In their work, Meier and Stewart (1991b) observe that there is a tradeoff between the level of second-generation discrimination which Latinos and African-Americans are subject to. Specifically, they argue that Latinos fare better in multiracial school districts because Anglos are more liable to target African-Americans for discrimination. In other words, in districts where African-Americans find themselves disproportionately represented in academic groupings, Latinos are more likely to find themselves proportionately represented. Meier and Stewart (1991b) speculate that this relationship is a function of the greater social resources available to Latinos, which result in more collegial relations with Anglos than African-Americans typically enjoy. This observation also serves to bring up a larger point: in multiracial settings, the nature of the relationship between one minority group and Anglos is partially dependent upon the nature of the relationship between Anglos and other minority groups.

When Latinos more closely resemble Anglos in terms of socioeconomic status, African-Americans are more likely to be targeted for discrimination. While Meier and

Stewart (1991b) assume that Latinos will possess the socioeconomic edge in most multiracial settings, recent demographic trends, such as the immigration of unskilled Latinos into the states such as North Carolina and Georgia, call into question whether this will be the case in all settings. When it is not the case, and African-Americans are the group which most resemble Anglos in terms of socioeconomic status, Latinos may find that they are more regularly subject to second-generation discrimination, generating the following hypotheses:

The smaller the disparity between African-American and Anglo socioeconomic status, the less African-Americans will be subject to second-generation discrimination.

The smaller the disparity between Latinos and Anglo socioeconomic status, the less Latinos will be subject to second-generation discrimination.

The smaller the disparity between African-American and Anglo socioeconomic status, relative to the disparity between Latinos and Anglos, the less African-Americans will be subject to second-generation discrimination.

The smaller the disparity between Latinos and Anglo socioeconomic status, relative to the disparity between African-Americans and Anglos, the less Latinos will be subject to second-generation discrimination.

Representative Bureaucracy

Scholars since Kingsley (1944) have considered how the demographic makeup of public organizations affects the policy outputs. Much of the work in this area has focused on the theory of representative bureaucracy. The essential hypothesis within the representative bureaucracy literature is that greater passive representation for some group, or the extent to which some group is employed by a public organization, leads to outputs which are in the expressed or understood interest of that group. While this basic hypothesis has been tested and confirmed on numerous occasions for a variety of groups, including African-Americans (Meier and Stewart 1992; Hindera 1993a), Latinos (Meier 1993; Hindera 1993b), Asian-Americans (Selden 1997), Native-Americans (Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998), and females (Keiser et al. 2002), scholars continue the debate the circumstances under which passive representation is most likely to translate into active presentation.

Organizational socialization and occupational professionalization, for example, are thought to limit importance of demographics within public agencies (Meier and Nigro 1976; Mosher 1982). Thompson (1976, 215) argues that active representation is most likely to occur when minority officials "deal with issues which have patent ramification for the well-being of their race." Minority officials, Thompson argues, involved in determining eligibility requirements for welfare recipients will enjoy a much clearer understanding of the implications of their actions for the well-being of minorities in general compared to officials at the Maritime Administration. Thompson further reasons that representation will occur when minorities occupy jobs low within the

hierarchy of an organization, which are typically characterized by relatively high degrees of behavioral discretion.

Judging from Thompson's criteria, public schools are organizations in which the predictions of the representative bureaucracy hypothesis are likely to prove true. Unlike the Maritime Administration, most minority educators are likely aware of the importance of education and the ability of educational quality to affect everything from future income (Cohen and Tyree 1986) to incarnation rates (Osher, Woodruff, and Sims 2002). Moreover, the relatively high level of discretion possessed by teachers (the street-level bureaucrat of the education system) affords them the opportunity to actively represent the interests of certain groups. Thus, it is not necessarily surprising that several studies have shown a positive relationship between minority representation on teaching faculties and minority student success, however defined (Barajas and Pierce 2001; Irvine 1989; Meier 1993; Meier and Stewart 1991b; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1990; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Meier 1995; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998).

However, the literature on representative bureaucracy, both inside and outside of the education system, has largely ignored how minority passive representation within governmental organizations benefits minority clientele in a *multi-minority* context. While it is well established that a minority group's clientele benefit from the presence of co-ethnic bureaucrats, it is unknown whether these benefits extend to non-co-ethnic minorities as well. That is, are African-Americans advantaged by the descriptive

representation of Latinos? Conversely, are Latinos advantaged by the descriptive representation of African-Americans?[12]

There are several reasons to suspect that the dynamic of Black/Brown competition noted in other works (e.g. Selden 1997, 93) may not apply to street-level bureaucrats, particularly teachers, implementing policies. First, Meier et al. (2004) contend that Black/Brown competition is most likely to occur in zero-sum situations (e.g. disputes over descriptive representation in political offices or civil service jobs), where success by one group would necessarily limit opportunities for others. The focus of this present study, second-generation discrimination, is largely exempt from the concerns over resource scarcity which may be present in other areas. For example, with regards to discipline, the failure of one student to be suspended does not necessitate the suspension of another student. It is equally unlikely that failing to assign one student to a special education class would force other students to be assigned. Such non-zero-sum situations should work to foster inter-minority cooperation, rather than promote conflict. Second, there is some evidence that Anglo students benefit from more diverse teaching facilities, opening the possibility the benefits of representative bureaucracy extend to non-co-ethnics (Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999). Lastly, unlike other situations, organizational socialization and professionalization may work to limit the use of second-

[12] Selden, Brudney, and Kellough (1998) provide evidence that an increase in the number minority supervisors employed by the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) is associated with an increase in the percent of loan eligibility decisions favoring minorities. However, as these results are not broken down into specific racial or ethnic groups, it remains unclear whether this result is primarily driven by African-American supervisors favoring African-American farmers and Latino supervisors favoring Latino farmers, or whether minority supervisors acted favorably toward all minority farmers.

generation discrimination tactics. Professionalization should work to create environments where procedures for discipline and academic groups are standardized, allowing less opportunity for second-generation discrimination to occur. Where there are obvious violations of standardized procedures, teachers who are sensitive to the issue of racial/ethnic equity may report them, regardless of whether the victims are African-American or Latino.

Increased African-American representation on teaching faculties will be associated with lower levels of second generation discrimination among African-American students.

Increased Latino representation on teaching faculties will be associated with lower levels of second generation discrimination among Latino students.

Increased Latino representation on teaching faculties will be associated with lower levels of second generation discrimination among African-American students.

Increased African-American representation on teaching faculties will be associated with lower levels of second generation discrimination among Latino students.

Modeling Second Generation Discrimination

The Office for Civil Rights periodically gathers data regarding academic grouping, discipline, and educational attainment. The national sample of school districts conducted by the OCR in 2000 is used for this study. Supplemental data regarding the demographic makeup of each district was obtained from the 2000 census. Census data

includes the racial composition of each district and the average level of socioeconomic resources present in each community by race. Lastly, the racial composition of teaching faculties was obtained from the National Latino Education Study. As the hypotheses require that districts have both African-American and Latino students, only districts with a student population which is at least one-percent African-American and one-percent Latino are included in the analysis. Within the sample, the mean percentage of Latino students is 18, while the mean percentage of African-American students is 16.

Discriminatory implementation practices are measured via an "odds ratio," which takes account of the relative odds of some group being disproportionately grouped or disciplined.[13] These ratios measure African-American and Latino grouping for Gifted and Talented programs, suspension rates, and classifications as mildly retarded. In order to illustrate the odds index, let us assume that we are attempting to calculate the odds of Latino students being disproportionately classified as mildly retarded. The index is calculated in the following manner:

(# of Latino Students Classified as Mildly Retarded / # of Latino Students) /

(Total # of Students Classified as Mildly Retarded / Total # of Students)

Assume that a district has a total enrollment of 100 students, 25 of which are Latino. The district also has 10 students classified as mildly retarded, 5 of which are Latino. 20% of Latino students are classified as mildly retarded, whereas the district average is 10%. This results in a value of 2 for the odds index, indicating that Latino students are

[13] Similar measures have been used by several other studies of academic grouping and second generation discrimination (e.g. Finn 1982; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991a; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1990; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998; but see Wainscott and Woodard 1988).

twice as likely to be classified as mildly retarded than the average student in the district. Several of the indexes, however, are skewed by extreme variables (a typical problem when using an odds ratio in this setting, see Finn 1982; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991b; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1990; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998). As extreme values can distort regression results by assigning too much weight to an outlying observation, each index is subject to a log transformation. Accordingly, the resulting coefficients must be interpreted as percentage changes in the dependent variable, not one-unit changes (Tufte 1974). In order to further ensure that the results are not driven by outlying cases, robust regressions are used for estimation.[14]

The first hypothesis proposes that the level of second-generation discrimination within a district is contingent upon the level of racial/ethnic diversity. As this hypotheses is taken directly from Hero's (1998) theory of social diversity, minority diversity is measured using an index identical to the one employed by Hero, which he adapts from a similar measure developed by Sullivan (1973). The formula is as follows: $1 - [(\text{Latino Population})^2 + (\text{African-American Population})^2 + (\text{Anglo Population})^2 + (\text{Other Population})^2]$. In order to capture diversity within schools, all population measures are based upon student population figures, rather than school district residents.

[14] As with the models presented in Chapters III and IV, I preformed diagnostics to in order to determine if the errors terms between the models for African-Americans and Latinos were correlated, warranting the use of Seeming Unrelated Regressions. The results of the Breusch-Pagan tests indicate that for each of the three sets of equations correlated errors are not an issue.

Socioeconomic disparities between African-Americans/Latinos and Anglos are measured using a series of income and education ratios (African-American per capita income/Anglo per capita income; % African-American College Graduates/% African-American College Graduates; Latino per capita income/Anglo per capita income; % Latino College Graduates/% Anglos College Graduates). Higher ratios should result in lower levels of discrimination. Extending the socioeconomic argument into a multi-minority context, each model of second-generation discrimination among African-Americans students contains a measure of the difference between the African-American/Anglo and Latino/Anglo SES ratios. Likewise, each model of second-generation discrimination among Latino students contains a measure of the difference between the Latino/Anglo and African-American/Anglo SES ratios. According to theories of race relations in multiracial areas, the more that one minority group resembles Anglos, the more likely that other minority groups will be targeted for discrimination. Hypotheses relating to representative bureaucracy are tested by accounting for the percentage of African-American and Latino teachers within a school district.

Lastly, the level of professionalization within a school district is also likely to affect the degree to which academic grouping is used as a means of discrimination against African-American and Latino students. Presumably, greater professionalization should result in a greater resistance toward using academic groupings for purposes other than their original educational function, such as second generation discrimination. Lacking a direct measure of professionalization, the size of the school district is included

in each model (larger school districts are assumed to be more professionalized, see Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Meier and Stewart 1991b; Wright, Hirlinger, and England 1998). Size is measured by the total number of the students (in thousands) enrolled within a district.

Findings

Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics for each of the measures of second generation discrimination used in the analysis. African-Americans appear to be the most dramatically affected by academic grouping. They are nearly twice as likely to be suspended (odds index=1.89) or classified as mildly retarded (odds index=1.92), while only half as likely to be enrolled in a gifted and talented program (odds index=.47). Latinos, at least in this sample, are worse off than African-Americans in terms of gifted and talented programs (odds index=.44); they are, however, in a far better position in terms of suspensions and mildly retarded classifications.

Table 5.1
Second-Generation Discrimination among Minority Students

	Mean	**Std. Dev.**
African-American GT Ratio	.47	.37
Latino GT Ratio	.44	.30
African-American Mild Retardation Ratio	1.92	1.53
Latino Mild Retardation Ratio	.93	1.11
African-American Suspension Ratio	1.89	.89
Latino Suspension Ratio	1.02	.54

Table 5.2 presents the results regarding the determinants of second generation discrimination among African-Americans. School district size is unrelated each odds index presented. In support of the hypothesis regarding the effect of racial context on second generation discrimination, minority diversity is negatively related to mild retardation classifications and suspensions, providing further evidence that academic grouping is less likely to occur in non-white districts even when controlling for the presence of minority teachers. Greater socioeconomic resources, relative to Anglos, typically result in more equitable levels of academic grouping for African-Americans. Moreover, there is some indications that African-American discrimination is dependent upon the disparity between Latino/Anglo SES as well as African-American/Anglos SES. Specifically, African-American enrollment in Gifted and Talented programs increases with the difference between the African-American College Education Ratio and the Latino College Education Ratio.

In support of the expectations set forth in the representative bureaucracy literature, the presence of African-American teachers is found to result in more equitable implementation practices for African-Americans for all three measures of second-generation discrimination. Interestingly, an increase in the percentage of Latino teachers results in lower levels of second generation discrimination against African-Americans for two of the three measures, GT placement and Mild Retardation. In the case of GT placements, the presence of Latino teachers appears to help African-American students to a greater degree than does African-American representation (for GT placement: African-American teachers coefficient = 1.45, while Latino teachers coefficient = 2.48).

Table 5.2
Determinants of Second-Generation Discrimination among African-American Students
Robust Regression Estimates

	GT Programs	**Mild Retardation**	**Suspensions**
Enrollment	-4.34e^04 (4.47e^04)	6.26e^04 (4.19e^04)	3.53e^04 (2.56e^04)
Minority Diversity Index	.187 (.103)	-.514** (.103)	-.310*** (.057)
% African-American Teachers	1.45** (.155)	-1.29** (.143)	-1.67** (.086)
% Latino Teachers	2.48** (.205)	-.746** (.243)	-.084 (.112)
African-American/White Income Ratio	.112 (.134)	-.515** (.136)	-.337** (.074)
African-American/White Income Ratio - Latino/White Income Ratio	.156 (.102)	-.078 (.091)	.024 (.068)
African-American/White College Graduates Ratio	.073 (.055)	.091 (.058)	-.032 (.032)
African-American/White College Graduates Ratio - Latino/White College Graduates Ratio	.085* (.040)	-.016 (.037)	.034 (.022)
Constant	-1.37** (.100)	1.26** (.099)	1.05** (.055)
R^2	.26	.17	.19
N	968	735	1030

Table 5.3
Determinants of Second-Generation Discrimination among Latino Students
Robust Regression Estimates

	GT Programs	**Mild Retardation**	**Suspensions**
Enrollment	4.60e^04 (5.12e^04)	3.70e^05 (5.40e^04)	1.20e^03** (3.36e^04)
Minority Diversity Index	.055 (.118)	-.176 (.140)	-.335** (.075)
% Latino Teachers	2.17** (.226)	.217 (.271)	-.126 (.148)
% African-American Teachers	1.30** (.179)	-1.65** (.190)	-1.83** (.113)
Latino/White Income Ratio	.586** (.151)	-.061 (.193)	-.335** (.097)
Latino/White Income Ratio - African-American/White Income Ratio	.008 (.119)	-.598** (.150)	-.229** (.077)
Latino/White College Graduates Ratio	.112 (.068)	.039 (.083)	-.014 (.040)
Latino/White College Graduates Ratio African-American/White College Graduates Ratio	-.073 (.047)	-.078 (.156)	-.045 (.028)
Constant	.149*** (.030)	.028 (.137)	.399**
R^2	.15	.21	.31
N	957	665	1014

Table 5.3 presents the results regarding the determinants of second generation discrimination among Latino students. Total enrollment, a proxy for professionalization, is again unrelated to GT placements and mild retardation classifications; however it is positively related to the Latino/Anglo suspensions ratio. Likewise, minority diversity appears to only be related to the suspensions ratio, with diversity proving to be negatively related to Latino overrepresentation. Consistent with the results for African-Americans, as Latinos look more like Anglos in terms of income, they are more likely to be placed in GT programs, and less likely to face suspensions. As hypothesized, Latinos appear to benefit from a large gap between the Latino/Anglo and Black/Anglo income ratios.

Co-ethnic representation within the education system increases Latino assignment to GT classes, but does not influence any other grouping measure. The presence of African-Americans on teaching facilities is also associated with a higher proportion of GT placements. While the effect is smaller than that for Latino teachers, the presence of African-American teachers is more consistently related to lower levels of second-generation discrimination, affecting each of the three indicators used in this analysis.

Conclusion

This study produces two primary findings. First, it reaffirms the notion that racial discrimination is contingent upon socioeconomic status. When minority groups look similar to Anglos, the level of discrimination they face within the education system is reduced. However, the relative status of other minority groups matters as well. When

the difference between African-Americans and Anglos is large, and the difference between Latinos and Anglos is small, African-Americans are especially vulnerable. The same holds true for Latinos when the African-Americans find themselves relatively better off in terms of income and education. Thus, as US schools become increasingly populated by children of color from a variety of backgrounds, it is important to remember that theories of race relations must move beyond Anglo – African-American or Anglo – Latino relations, and consider how multiple racial/ethnic groups interact, and how such interactions affect the lives of minority students differently.

Second, this study extends the literature on representative bureaucracy by examining whether minority students benefit from the presence of non-co-ethnic minorities on teaching facilities. Surprisingly, the findings suggest that not only do non-co-ethnic minority teachers lower levels of second generation discrimination among minority students; they do so consistently and with a substantive impact that occasionally rivals that of co-ethnic teachers. Further work concerning the role perception of minority teachers toward non-co-ethnic minority students needs to be done in order to fully understand this relationship. Together, these findings suggest that Black/Brown cooperation may be commonplace among bureaucrats charged with implementing public policy, at least in the case of education. Meanwhile competitive forces remain at work within the larger environment external to the educational bureaucracy.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The nature of racial and ethnic politics in the United States is changing. For most of American history, the political fate of American-Americans and Latinos has depended upon their relationship with the Anglo community. As residential patterns have changed to create numerous multiracial areas within the United States, so has the potential for the formation of alternative racial coalitions. The possibility now exists for African-Americans and Latinos to form rainbow coalitions with one another, promoting the interests of both groups and increasing their mutual political success even when faced with opposition from a conservative Anglo community. But do they? This has been the central question of this project. The answer, as one might suspect, is sometimes. The question then becomes, what are the circumstances which promote or hamper the formation of rainbow coalitions? This project has suggested many possible circumstances, including socioeconomic conditions, electoral structure, changing demographic contexts, scarcity of resources, and organizational professionalism. Below I review the findings which this project produces and consider their implications for other literatures and future studies of inter-minority relations.

Regarding African-American and Latino conflict in the electoral arena, Chapter III shows that despite commonly held beliefs about the ideological similarity between African-Americans and Latinos, there is little evidence for the routine formation of rainbow coalitions in most school districts. Inter-minority conflict, not cooperation, remains the norm. Yet, Chapter III also demonstrates that the patterns of black-Latino

conflict have changed. Fifteen years ago, Meier and Stewart (1991a, 1991b) found that Anglo-Latino coalitions were an expected substitute for inter-minority ones. Borrowing from theories of social distance within sociology, Meier and Stewart (1991a) argued that Anglos would prefer to form coalitions with Latinos, whom Anglos feel are closer to themselves than African-Americans. Meier and Stewart's work offers a compelling explanation as to why scholars have been unable to observe rainbow coalitions in the vast majority of urban areas across the United States. Its shortcoming, however, is its failure to account for the heterogeneity in the Latino population which results from the continuing immigration of foreign born Latinos into the United States.

The notion that Anglos prefer the political incorporation of Latinos over African-Americans is predicated upon the assumption that Anglos believe Latinos most resemble themselves. This assumption, however, is unlikely to hold when the Latino population in question is comprised primarily of Latino immigrants, whose cultural and linguistic differences often outweigh the historical political animosity between Anglos and African-Americans. The result is that African-American incorporation onto local school boards is higher in districts with larger Latino non-citizen populations. As, Latino non-citizens do not have the option to support African-American candidates, this relationship occurs because of the increased propensity of Anglos to support the incorporation of African-Americans into governing coalitions in such districts. Chapter III does not offer any illustrations of this process, beyond summarizing what we know about individual-level attitudes of and towards Latino immigrants. In-depth case studies of districts with

large African-American and Latino immigrant populations, thus, are one potentially fruitful avenue for further research.

The most significant contribution of this study of interracial coalitions in local school board elections comes not from the discovery that Latino immigration fundamentally alters the dynamics of coalitional formations, after all the mechanism by which Latino immigration is thought to influence the process (social distance) is identical to the one hypothesized by Meier and Stewart (1991a, 1991b). Rather, the attention which this study pays to the way in which electoral structure fundamentally alters the nature of coalition building offers the greatest contribution to our knowledge of African-American and Latino relationships in the electoral arena.

School board elections, because they offer such diversity in election rules, present an ideal case to examine how different structures, such as partisan systems, can influence interracial relations and coalitions. In the end, electoral structure is found to be an extremely important determinant of the formation of rainbow coalitions. All evidence of American-American and Latino electoral competition is confined to non-partisan systems. In partisan systems there is no evidence of inter-minority conflict; rather, what evidence does exist for the presence of interracial coalitions points towards rainbow coalitions. Partisan affiliation, thus, can serve as a way to unite ideologically liberal racial and ethnic minorities. Meanwhile, individuals living in non-partisan systems are more likely to rely on racial cues which are easier to discern than ideological ones. As African-Americans and Latinos tend to express negative attitudes towards one another in

a variety of circumstances (see Mindiola et al. 2002), this limits the likelihood of a rainbow coalitions, instead producing inter-minority conflict.

Even without the benefit of electoral support from other minority groups, partisan systems tend to be characterized by much higher levels of minority representation. That is, the ability of minority groups to translate population size into political representation is greatly increased under partisan systems. In fact, Chapter III suggests that minorities may be slightly *overrepresented* given their population size (although this is only true for Latinos if you discount the non-citizen population). Such benefits, however, remain confined to the relatively small number of districts (approximately 14%) that use such systems.

This finding is especially interesting given the complex and, at times, antagonistic relationship which has historically existed between minorities and the Democratic Party. Before the partisan realignment of the mid-1990s, the South, as well as much of the Southwest, functioned under a one-party system. With racially conservative Anglos denominating the Democratic Party in a number of states, minorities were forced to form minor parties and activist organizations, such as La Raza Unida or Black Panthers, achieving only isolated electoral success. Thus, throughout most of modern American history, partisanship has been a vehicle for minority disenfranchisement, not minority political success. In the mid-1990s, however, many racially conservative Anglos left the Democratic Party, which at the national-level had long changed its positions on many key racial issues, to join the Republicans (Lublin 2004). As a result, Democrats found themselves increasingly in need of minority votes.

Minorities responded by staging takeovers of many local Democratic Party chapters, while continuing to promote a liberal racial agenda. As Winter Garden states, "we wouldn't have to change our philosophy or our politics or how we educate our kids just because we call ourselves Democrats" (Montejano 1987, 290). The result has been that, in contemporary Southern, Southwestern, and urban politics, minorities have become indispensable partners of the Democratic Party, and have been rewarded accordingly in areas with strong party organizations.

Non-partisan systems originally gained popularity during the progressive movement as a way to depoliticize the education policymaking process. This is a task at which appear unsuccessful. As the results in Chapter III demonstrate, non-partisan elections redistribute electoral advantages and incentives for coalition building away from some groups (namely, African-Americans and Latinos) and towards others (Anglos). The election of school board members *is* a political process, and there is something to be gained by the use of electoral rules which acknowledge this reality.

The final finding of Chapter III is that the formation of different interracial coalitions differs in extremely heterogeneous contexts. African-Americans benefit from the presence of a large Latino population in districts where no individual racial/ethnic group comprises a majority of the population but the combined racial/ethnic minority population does. This is true even in non-partisan systems, where (as just noted) the probability inter-minority competition is high. Once again, only 3% of all districts meet this demographic criterion, so that in the vast majority of school districts within the United States, competition, not cooperation, remains the norm. Nevertheless, it is

important to see that African-Americans and Latinos do seem to enter into cooperative electoral relationships when the electoral structure in place facilitates it or the demographic context encourages it.

Chapter IV looks beyond the causes of interracial electoral coalitions, instead focusing on the nature of African-American and Latino relations within the legislative stage of the education policymaking process. As in many previous studies, Chapter IV shows that descriptive representation is tied to substantive representation, with the percentage of African-American administrators increasing along with the percentage of African-American school board members and similar patterns holding for Latinos. I expand on this finding, however, by examining whether African-Americans and Latinos are better or less able to substantively represent their group's interest on school boards on which both groups serve.

Borrowing from the urban politics literature, substantive representation is defined as the relationship between the presence of a minority group on the school board and the presence of members of that same group among school administrators and teachers. While there are numerous other ways in which one could potentially conceptualize substantive representation, I chose to rely on this measure in order to draw comparisons to previous studies in urban politics, many of which measure substantive representation as the percentage of minority municipal employees. Within the urban politics tradition, there is a clear pattern of the share of public jobs held by minorities increasing along with minority representation in elected office (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Chandler and Gely 1995; Dye and Renick 1981; Eisinger 1982a, 1982b; Kerr and

Mladenka 1994; Mladenka 1989a, 1989b). This measure also has the advantage of meeting the definitions for several of types of substantive representation discussed in the literature, including Eulau and Karps (1977) descriptions of service responsiveness, symbolism, and policy responsiveness (Chapter IV offers a more elaborate discussion of this point).

Given that Chapter III finds that electoral coalitions between African-Americans and Latinos are relatively rare, it is not surprising that Chapter IV offers no evidence of African-American and Latino legislative cooperation. Indeed, the findings suggest that the substantive representation of African-Americans is neither positively or negative effected by the presence of Latinos on the board. For Latinos, however, political representation has less of a positive impact on the percentage of Latino administrators and teachers when they serve on boards alongside African-Americans.

In order to come to a more complete understanding of Latino employment within the education system, Chapter IV also posits and tests an alternative hypothesis: Latinos will fare less well in terms of substantive representation in areas where the rate of Latino population growth is high. Administrative and teaching positions exist within a "soft" zero-sum context in that districts do have the ability create additional slots, but the limited resources available to districts often seriously constrains their ability to do so. Providing positions to Latinos in line with their proportion of the population would require lowering the share for other groups, including African-Americans, and upsetting the status quo.

The results presented in Chapter IV confirm the contention that Latino population growth is a significant determinant of the extent to which Latinos will be able to achieve their desired level of substantive representation. This result holds considerable implications for the future of Latino politics. Unlike African-Americans, the Latino political experience is complicated by a rapidly growing population. While this is true in the Southwest, many areas of the country now find themselves encountering "emerging" Latino populations. These emerging populations are characterized not only by extremely high rates of growth, but also by low levels of citizenship, education, income, and fluency in English. As Chapter III demonstrates, Latino immigration plays a crucial role in interracial dynamics. Compounding immigration with extremely high growth rates, then, serves to further depress Latino political success in a number of districts throughout the United States.

A final insight offered by Chapter IV is that the different contexts which Latinos create, dependent upon their nativity and growth rates, complicates the study of racial and ethnic politics in general and inter-minority competition in particular. For example, while both hypotheses presented in Chapter IV (that Latinos are less able to substantively represent their group's interest on school boards on which African-American serve and that Latinos fare less well in terms of substantive representation in areas where the rate of Latino population growth is high) are plausible, empirical tests are complicated by the fact that school districts in which Latinos serve on the board with African-Americans are precisely those districts which are also characterized by a relatively high rate of Latino population growth.

When both explanations are tested within the same model, Latino population growth retains significance while the hypothesis pertaining to multi-minority school boards does not, suggesting that the diminished ability of Latinos to translate their descriptive representation into substantive representation in districts where both Latinos and African-Americans serve on the board is likely a function of the high rates of Latino population growth which also characterizes such districts. This also highlights the importance of considering multiple explanations within the same model. This is especially true if the competing explanations correlate with each other very well. As Chapter IV warns, without such tests, one cannot make definitive statements about causality and run a serious risk of reporting spurious results.

The final empirical chapter in this project is an examination of how African-American – Latino relations affect levels of "second-generation discrimination" among minority students. The chapter began with a discussion of the theory of representative bureaucracy, which holds that public organizations become more responsive to the public's interest as they become more representative of the public in terms of demographic characteristics because persons of comparable demographic backgrounds will possess comparable values due to similar socialization experiences. The theory of representative bureaucracy assumes that these values will influence bureaucratic decision making, especially when bureaucrats enjoy discretion in the implementation of policies. Education policy, then, provides an excellent opportunity to test this theory as it involves substantial discretion at all levels of implementation.

Indeed, the theory of representative bureaucracy has found considerable support in a substantial body of literature examining education policy. Empirical research has found that increased minority representation among teachers and administrators is strongly associated with less discrimination, more favorable policies, and improved student performance (see Seldon 1997 for a review). Meier, Stewart, and England (1989) found that school districts with more African-American teachers adopted policies that were more beneficial for black students. Likewise, Latino teacher representation has been found to reduce discriminatory policies toward Latino students and is linked with higher performance (Meier and Stewart 1991a, Meier 1993).

However, the literature on representative bureaucracy has not addressed whether minority passive representation within governmental organizations benefits minority clientele in a *multi-minority* context. Accordingly, Chapter V seeks to determine whether minorities benefit from the presence of non-co-ethnic minorities. In other words, are African-Americans advantaged by the descriptive representation of Latinos? Conversely, are Latinos advantaged by the descriptive representation of African-Americans?

Interestingly, Chapter V concludes that non-co-ethnic minority teachers do lower levels of second generation discrimination among minority students. In fact, they do so across multiple indicators, with the percentage of Latino teachers lowering the degree to which African-Americans are underrepresented in GT programs and overrepresented among students who are classified as mildly mentally retarded. African-Americans teachers, for their part, also appear to increase Latino placement in GT programs. Moreover, the substantive impact on non-co-ethnic minority teachers sometimes rivals

that of co-ethnic teachers, as Latino teachers appear to limit African-American exclusion from GT programs and mildly retarded classification to a larger extend than African-American teachers.

There are several possible explanations for this finding. First, the presence of minorities, whether they are African-American or Latino, could serve to heighten awareness regarding issues pertaining to race within the education system, such as the increased propensity of minority students to be grouped into remedial programs. Likewise, minority teachers may perceive part of their role as monitoring grouping and discipline practices towards all traditionally disadvantaged groups, regardless of race or ethnicity. More work pertaining to role perception among minorities is needed in order to fully understand the casual mechanism behind this relationship.

While the presence of minority teachers is something which districts can influence, socioeconomic conditions are not (at least in the short term). However, Chapter V reaffirms that contention that racial discrimination is contingent upon socioeconomic status. Lower socioeconomic conditions for a minority group tend to be coupled with higher levels of second generation discrimination. Inter-minority tension can also be created as a result of socioeconomic conditions, with one group being especially vulnerable top discrimination when another minority group is closer to Anglos in terms of socioeconomic status

This project offers a complex, but intuitively predictable, portrait of inter-minority relations in urban school districts. Chapters III and IV offer little hope for those who wish to see minorities work together in order to maximize their political success.

Inter-minority competition exists, and Latinos appear to be the biggest losers of this phenomenon. Chapter V, however, indicates that inter-minority cooperation not only exists, but also plays a major role in preventing discrimination against minority students. The question is why, at the final stage of policymaking with the US education system, does the reality of inter-minority competition becomes overturned suddenly.

It appears that scarcity of resources fosters competition between groups that might otherwise be expected to form cooperative relationships. School board seats are fixed, and an increase in the descriptive representation of one group necessarily lowers the amount of descriptive representation available for others. Administrative and teaching positions are a similarly scarce resource. Academic grouping and discipline policies, however, are relatively free from concerns relating to scarcity. There is no minimum number of disciplinary actions which a district must take against its students, nor is there a minimum number of students which a district is required to classify as mentally retarded. Together, these findings would seem to confirm the argument made by Meier et al. (2004) that inter-minority competition is most likely to occur in zero-sum situations, as well as work by McClain (1993), who finds that economic conditions engender competition.

A second explanation is that the tendency of African-Americans and Latinos to enter into cooperative or competitive relationships is highly dependent upon the actors involved in the policymaking process. At the early stages of the policymaking process, the actors, whether they be local elites attempting to forge an electoral coalition or school board members seeking to shape district policies, may view their constituencies

in very narrow terms. Teachers, who are charged with the implementation of educational policies in the classroom, may be less prone to viewing themselves as charged with the promotion of one specific group's well being. Rather, professionalism among minorities may work to limit the use of second-generation discrimination tactics, regardless of which groups are being targeted. If this is true, it would also explain why other works have found that more diverse teaching faculties are associated with high levels of student performance, regardless of the race of the student (Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999).

Indeed, these findings also compliment the conclusions which urban politics scholars reached years ago concerning the relationship between race and the distribution of urban services. Researchers such as Sjoberg, Brymer, and Ferris (1966) hypothesize that services are unequally distributed across urban areas, with areas containing high minority populations systematically receiving less services. However, most other studies conclude that this is not the case (Howell 2000; Lineberry 1977; Mladenka 1980, 1981; Mladenka and Hill 1978). For example, Mladenka and Hill (1978) find that police response times do not vary based upon the racial or socioeconomic makeup of the neighborhood. Rather, response time is a function of the gravity of the reported offense. Similarly, Mladenka (1980) argues that distribution patterns are a consequence of professional values and technical-rational criteria; he (1980, 997) concludes, "organizational rules provide a better explanation of who gets what than any combination of distinctly political and electoral variables."

Yet, Chapter V also suggests that Mladenka is partially incorrect. Socioeconomic conditions do partially determine the distribution of advantages and disadvantages within the educational system. However, political relationships do manifest themselves differently, with African-American and Latino teachers forming cooperative, not competitive, relationships. In short, the more insulated a set of actors are from the overtly political and electoral environment, the less emphasis they place on racial heuristics for determining of "who gets what when." While it is easy to see how electoral politics might be aided by the use of racial heuristics, street-level bureaucrats may interpret their mission in less competitive and cynical terms.

Conclusion

As Jennings (1997) states and Chapter I demonstrates, "it is clear that the bigger American cities and key electoral states are becoming increasingly populated by blacks *and* Latinos." A proper understanding of how African-American–Latino relations operate is becoming increasingly necessary for scholars who desire to fully understand the dynamics of urban political bodies. While several scholars have used survey data to understand the attitudinal foundation of inter-minority coalitions, (Jackson, Gerber, and Cain 1994; Garcia 2000), we know far less about how competition plays out in the bureaucracy and policymaking process (see McClain and Karnig 1990; McClain 1933; Meier and Stewart 1991b). This project has offered the first systematic study of American-Americans and Latino cooperation and conflict at every stage of the policymaking process, from elections to policy outputs.

The last pages of *Pursuing Power*, the last major work collected on the subject of Latino Politics, Jennings (1997) lists several questions that the literature has thus far not fully addressed. The one of these reads, "What conditions or factors lead to political cooperation or competition between black and Latino activists?" The answers appear to be many, and include electoral structure, resource scarcity, the actors involved in decision making, and social diversity.

The approach this study has taken offers several advantages, and has substantially improved upon our understanding of whether African-American political success tends to benefit for hinder Latino political efforts and vice versa. Yet, it remains limited in several respects. Its reliance on quantitative methods provides evidence that the patterns of inter-minority relations discussed throughout this work are not idiosyncratic, a concern in other works which rely upon other forms of analysis in a handful of urban areas.

Unfortunately, it also leaves us with an incomplete understanding of the nuances of inter-minority relations. How do Anglo elites approach African-Americans when the Latino population within a district is comprised largely of immigrants? Do they actively seek the incorporation of African-American candidates or are they more passive in process? Similarly, are Latinos less likely to translate descriptive representation into substantive representation in districts where they serve on the board with African-Americans because African-Americans actively compete with Latinos or because African-Americans are, for whatever reason, better able than Latinos to effectively represent their group's interests (thereby limiting the potential resources available for

Latinos). Ultimately, this work is best approached in conjunction with other works that utilize elite interviews, focus groups, or in-depth case studies of select urban areas to understand the nature of African-American and Latino cooperation and conflict in urban school districts.

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